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THE BEST WAY OUT IS ALWAYS THROUGH:† CHANGING THE EMPLOYMENT AT-
WILL DEFAULT TO PROTECT PERSONAL AUTONOMY 
 
Matthew T. Bodie* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Employment at-will is the default rule of termination for the vast majority of American 
employment relationships.  The rule creates a presumption—a strong one—that the contract for 
employment allows either party to terminate the contract at any point in time.  Since its inception, 
this bright line rule has given way to carefully curated exceptions, primarily to protect against 
discrimination and retaliation.  This Article proposes that state courts create a new exception to the 
at-will rule—or, perhaps more accurately, acknowledge an intricacy within the existing default.  The 
personal-autonomy presumption would modify at-will to make clear that employers will not take any 
action against an employee based on the employee’s personal autonomy, so long as that autonomy 
does not interfere with the employer’s business or reputation.  Employee personal autonomy would be 
defined to include political affiliations, religious observance, and recreational activities.  The default 
rule would hold that, as part of the bargain between employer and employee, the employer agrees not 
to leverage the power that it exercises in the work realm to influence employees improperly in the 
personal realm.  In order to change the default autonomy rule, employers would need to further 
develop their expectations as to off-duty conduct and communicate those expectations to employees.  
As a result, the employment contract would provide both employers and employees with a better 
understanding of performance requirements and of the boundaries of their relationship. 
 
 
  
                                                          
† ROBERT FROST, A Servant to Servants, in NORTH OF BOSTON 66 (1914) (“He says the best way out is 
always through./And I agree to that, or in so far/As that I can see no way out but through— . . . .”). 
* Callis Family Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; Co-Reporter, Restatement of 
Employment Law.  This Article represents my own perspective and not those of the American Law 
Institute or my fellow reporters.  I am much obliged for comments from participants in the Saint 
Louis University Faculty Workshop Series and the 2014 Law & Society Annual Meeting, as well as 
thoughts and suggestions from ALI members and advisors on the multiple iterations of § 7.08 of the 
Restatement.  I am also grateful to Saint Louis University School of Law for funding through its 
former Summer Research Grant program.  I greatly appreciate comments and suggestions from 
Miriam Cherry, Dennis Corgill, Zev Eigen, Michael Fischl, Ruben Garcia, Charlotte Garden, Jesse 
Goldner, Tim Greaney, John Griesbach, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Marcia McCormick, Carol 
Needham, Karen Sanner, Paul Secunda, and Doug Williams.  In addition, I was fortunate to receive 
thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts from students in Miriam Cherry’s “Virtual Work” and “People 
Analytics” classes. Many thanks to Jim Dougherty and Cody Huffines for excellent research 
assistance.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The “employment at-will” doctrine serves as the presumptive default rule for 
the vast majority of American employment relationships.1  Despite its hoary 
provenance and established mien,2 the doctrine has been consistently attacked by 
                                                          
1 See Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of at-Will Employment As an Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom 
of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 459 (2008) (“Today, the at-will rule remains the default 
employment rule in every state but Montana . . . .”).   A classic formulation of the rule can be found in 
Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. 
Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915) (“[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell 
where they please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even 
for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which an employe 
may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the 
employer.”). The Restatement of Employment Law sets forth the at-will rule as the presumptive 
default. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (2015) (“Either party may terminate an 
employment relationship with or without cause unless the right to do so is limited by statute, other 
law or public policy, or an agreement between the parties, a binding employer promise, or a binding 
employer policy statement.”).   
2 HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (John D. 
Parsons, Jr. ed., 1877). See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common 
Law Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1520-21 (2014) (“Since almost every 
jurisdiction has judicially embraced Wood's statement of the law, it is now firmly ensconced . . . .”). 
3 
generations of academics.3  Its critics deplore the complete and largely unreviewable 
control over the employment relationship that it provides to employers.  Moreover, 
some have also argued that the at-will rule represents a poor reading of common-law 
contract doctrine.4  Rather than merely serving as a presumption, the at-will rule has 
become a much stickier default in many jurisdictions, rolling like a steamroller over 
evidence of contrary intent.5  Combining questionable assumptions about the parties’ 
intent with arguably retrograde policy effects, the at-will rule has all the hallmarks of 
a creature of Lochner-ian laissez-faire jurisprudence, except that it lives on into the 
present. And yet, no American court has adopted anything to the contrary.6 
 The at-will rule is best understood as a compromise between courts and 
employers over decisionmaking authority within the employment relationship.7  
Courts have largely granted to employers unreviewable discretion over that 
relationship unless outside concerns come into play.  The employer is given leeway 
to judge for itself whether the employee fits within the internal organization of the 
firm.  In return, courts intrude when employers use their power to harm third-party 
interests.8  The balance between impacts outside and inside the boundaries of the 
firm best explains why courts have provided the at-will presumption with such 
power.  However, this balance has often been lost in many explanations of the rule.  
Instead of framing the at-will rule as a method of providing the employer with 
control over business-related functions, it is instead framed as complete and 
unreviewable discretion to fire someone “for any reason, or no reason at all.”9  This 
wide-open discretion is at odds with workers’ actual understanding of the at-will rule, 
                                                          
3 E.g. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of 
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967); Matthew Finkin, et al., Working Group on Chapter 
2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL'Y J. 93, 100 (2009); Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads 
Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 65-66 (1988); Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the 
United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 77-78 (2000). 
4 Finkin et al., supra note 3, at 95-107 (arguing that the at-will rule is in greater flux than generally 
appreciated).  
5 See Deborah A. DeMott, Investing in Work: Wilkes As an Employment Law Case, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 497, 509 (2011) (suggest that “the at-will rule may be a sticky default more often and for a more 
complex set of reasons than heretofore believed”). 
6 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 cmt. b (2015) (“The high courts in 49 states and the 
District of Columbia recognize as the default rule the principle that employment is presumptively an 
at-will relationship.  (The sole exception is Montana, which by statute requires ‘good cause’ . . . .)”). 
7 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1938 (1996) (arguing that even though most employment relationships have a 
norm of only for-cause termination, this norm should not be enforced by courts). 
8 See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01 (2015) (setting forth the tort of wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy). 
9 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Iowa 2000). 
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in which employees actually expect that employers are limited to something much 
closer to just cause.10 
 In order to restore the balance inherent in the at-will compromise, courts 
should refine that doctrine by adding another default presumption: that the employer 
will not make employee-related decisions based on employee actions or beliefs that 
lie outside of the employment relationship.11  This addendum reflects simply the 
other side of the at-will coin: complete employer discretion over on-the-job 
decisions, but no employer discretion over decisions that are not related to 
employment.  Such a reform would make the rule not only a more balanced 
compromise between the needs of employer and employee, but it would also better 
reflect the general understanding of the employment relationship.  No employee 
goes into the employment relationship expecting that the employer will use that 
relationship to pressure the employee into changing her personal life.  A carve-out 
for employee decisions, beliefs, and activities that take place outside the workplace—
which I label as “personal autonomy”—puts the at-will rule on more solid footing, 
both doctrinally and empirically. 
 Protecting personal autonomy would also provide a principled approach to 
regulating employer discretion within the workplace.  Many of the statutory or 
common-law doctrines that modify or limit the at-will rule are related to concerns 
about employee autonomy.12  And yet specific autonomy protections remain 
relegated to the public sector (through the First Amendment)13 or to state statutory 
schemes (such as off-duty laws).14  A common-law recognition for an autonomy 
carve-out would be in keeping with the role of courts in creating and maintaining the 
at-will doctrine.  And it would provide a principled defense for the at-will rule 
itself—a defense that currently rests on weak doctrinal and theoretical foundations. 
 This Article presents the argument for an autonomy addendum to 
employment at-will.  Part I discusses the at-will rule, its role in the employment 
relationship, and its stickiness as a default.  Part II discusses the concept of employee 
personal autonomy, and it sets forth the numerous existing common-law and 
statutory protections that address autonomy concerns.  Part III discusses two ways in 
which the common law could protect autonomy: through a wrongful discharge tort 
                                                          
10 See Rock & Wachter, supra note 7, at 1930 (“We know that generally, even in non-union firms, the 
norm governing termination is “no discharge without cause.”).  In an empirical study of worker 
attitudes, Pauline Kim found that 89% of respondents felt that it would be unlawful for an employer 
to terminate an employee based on personal dislike.  Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect 
Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an at-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 
134 (1997).   
11 This new presumption is set forth in RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.08 (2015).  This 
Article represents an extended argument in support of § 7.08. 
12 See Part II.B infra. 
13 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (noting that constitutional privacy interests include 
“the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions”); see also Part II.B.6 infra. 
14 See Part II.B.5 infra. 
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or through a contractual default rule.  It argues that the common law should 
recognize a personal-autonomy presumption within the overall at-will rule.  
Although there are merits to mandatory protection through tort, a contractual 
approach better matches with the at-will rule as well as the nuanced relationship 
between firms and employees.   
 
 
I.  THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DEFAULT 
 
A. The Common-Law Doctrine of At-Will 
 
Employees with indefinite term contracts are presumed to be working at will.  
That presumption replaced the prior English rule, which assumed that employees 
had been hired for a year, in order to protect seasonal agricultural workers from 
being released in the cold of winter.15  The traditional story lays the blame for this 
change on Horace Wood, whose treatise somberly laid out the basics: “With us the 
rule is inflexible, that a general of indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at-will, and 
if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is on him to establish it 
by proof.”16  Commentators have questioned Wood’s support for his rule, implying 
that he fabricated it with little precedential backing.17  Others, however, have argued 
that the rule was well-established, and in turn questioned the importance of Wood’s 
actual role.18  Regardless of its provenance, the rule proved extremely popular with 
courts, and it is now the unquestioned default rule in forty-nine of the fifty states.19 
                                                          
15 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425 (Christian, 12th ed. 1793) (finding the rule in 
employment to be: “[i]f the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes it 
to be a hiring for a year”), cited in Feinman, supra note JF1, at 119-20. 
16 WOOD, supra note 2, § 134, at 272. 
17 An A.L.R. entry was the first to question Wood’s support for his rule.  Annotation, Duration of 
Contract of Hiring Which Specified No Term, but Fixes Compensation at a Certain Amount Per Day, 
Week, Month, or Year, 11 A.L.R. 469, 475-76 (1921) (saying that the “proposition was without any 
authority whatever to support it.”).  See also Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment At 
Will Rule, 20 Am. J. Legal Hist. 118, 126-27 (1976) (questioning whether Wood’s Rule was based on 
solid doctrinal support); Gary Minda, The Common Law of Employment At-Will in New York: The Paralysis 
of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 970 (1985) (“Commentators now agree that 
Wood invented his own rule.”). 
18 Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of “Wood’s Rule” Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 551, 558 (1990) (“Horace Wood did not make up the rule of employment at will. He just told it 
like it was.”)’; Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of 
Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 756 (1994) (finding support for Wood’s Rule at the time of 
publication). 
19 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 cmt. b (2015) (“The high courts in 49 states and the 
District of Columbia recognize as the default rule the principle that employment is presumptively an 
at-will relationship.  (The sole exception is Montana, which by statute requires ‘good cause’ . . . .)”).  
The at-will rule has been codified in some states. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-7-1 (“An indefinite 
hiring may be terminated at will by either party.”). 
6 
 
The at-will rule creates a presumption that the employee can be terminated 
without cause—or, as many courts have framed it, “for any reason, or no reason at 
all.”20  The notion is that both employers and employees are free to walk away from 
the relationship at any time.  As a presumption, the at-will doctrine serves as a 
default rule that applies if the parties have not specified otherwise.  Employees can 
receive any sort of protection under contract, if they negotiate for such.  Outside of 
high-level executives or employees represented by unions, however, most employees 
in the United States work under an at-will regime.21 
 Default rules are a common way of resolving ambiguities or incomplete 
terms within contracts.  The common law recognizes a set of default contract 
terms,22 as does the Uniform Commercial Code.23  Default rules are often necessary 
to fill in gaps when the parties have failed to specify a term that is or becomes 
necessary to determine whether the contract was formed or has been breached.  In 
choosing which default rule to put into place, most commentators have argued that 
default rules should mimic what the parties would have chosen on their own.24  
Because the purpose of contract enforcement is to enforce the intent of the parties, 
defaults should arguably follow the intent of the parties, even if the particular intent 
is not available. 
 However, the at-will presumption has become more than just a default rule.  
It has become a “sticky” default—a default that is difficult to overcome as a matter 
                                                          
20 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Iowa 2000).  This quote can be 
found in over 475 cases dealing with at-will employment.  See Westlaw search, (employ! /s "at will" at-
will) /p "for any reason or no reason at all", Allcases database, March 10, 2016 (revealing 476 results). 
21 Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
8, 28 (1993) (“The empirical claim that most private employees are at will is rarely disputed.”).  Unions 
generally include just-cause provisions within their grievance-arbitration systems.  See Rachel Arnow-
Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 (2010) (“In negotiating 
collective terms of employment, unions almost always seek and achieve just cause protection for their 
workers, a fact widely observed in the just cause literature.”). 
22 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981) (providing default for time when 
acceptance takes place); id. § 222 (providing default rule for trade-usage evidence); id. § 223 (providing 
default rule for course of dealing evidence). 
23 See, e.g., U.C.C. §2-305 (providing for a “reasonable price” as a default when the price is not 
otherwise set);  
§ 2-307 (establishing default rules for delivery lots); § 2-308 (providing default places for place of 
delivery); § 2-314 (providing for a default warranty of merchantability). 
24 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 
YALE L.J. 87, 89-90 (1989) (“Few academics have gone beyond one-sentence theories stipulating that 
default terms should be set at what the parties would have wanted.”); see also RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 372 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing that default rules should “economize on 
transaction costs by supplying standard contract terms that the parties would otherwise have to adopt 
by express agreement”). 
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of common-law doctrine.25  Courts generally do not parse the entire context of the 
employment relationship to divine the actual intentions of the parties as to grounds 
for termination. Instead, the at-will rule is presumed unless there is fairly convincing 
evidence to the contrary.  In fact, courts have often ignored evidence of contrary 
intent by using idiosyncratic doctrines that ignore or discount such evidence.26 
The primary way in which the at-will rule is doctrinally sticky is the power of 
the default presumption.  The presumption itself is often characterized as “strong” 
or “heavy.”27  Courts generally require “unequivocal” or “unambiguous” evidence in 
order to overcome the default.28  To take one example, the Texas Supreme Court has 
held that for the at-will presumption to be overcome, “the employer must 
unequivocally indicate a definite intent to be bound not to terminate the employee 
except under clearly specified circumstances.”29 Even an employer statement that the 
employee will be discharged only for “good reason” or “good cause” is insufficient 
“when there is no agreement on what those terms encompass.”30  Even though at-
will is only a default, it overrides evidence to the contrary unless that evidence 
unambiguously sets it aside.31 
                                                          
25 DeMott, supra note 5, at 498, 509; see also Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of 
Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 677 (2006) (finding the at-will rule to be “highly sticky” as a 
default). 
26 Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment Relationship, 10 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (“The law of employment contracts is highly idiosyncratic.”); Franklin 
G. Snyder, The Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships on the Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 33 (2003) (“The relationship between employment and contract law is peculiar.”). 
27 Southward v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 926, 931 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (finding that “[t]here is 
a strong presumption of at-will employment” ); Ritter v. Pepsi Cola Operating Co. of Chesapeake & 
Indianapolis, 785 F. Supp. 61, 63 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (“In Pennsylvania, there is a very strong 
presumption of at-will employment relationships and the level of proof required to overcome this 
presumption is arduous.”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 440 (Del. 
1996) (noting “a heavy presumption that a contract for employment, unless otherwise expressly 
stated, is at-will in nature, with duration indefinite”). 
28 See, e.g., MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 760 (3d ed. 2004) (finding that “[o]ral 
representations for permanent employment . . . must be clear and unequivocal enough to overcome 
the presumption that employment is at will”); Paul G. Beers, Employment Law, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1007, 1040 (1994) (“The employer's promise of continued employment must be unambiguous.”).   
29 Montgomery Cty. Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998). 
30 Id. See also Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 783 (Okla. 1995) (requiring “definite and specific 
promises by the employer”); Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 275 (requiring that 
“oral statements of job security must be clear and unequivocal to overcome the presumption of 
employment at will”). 
31 Not all jurisdictions require clear and definite evidence.  See, e.g., Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 
P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (“This presumption can be overcome by an affirmative showing by the 
plaintiff that the parties expressly or impliedly intended a specified term or agreed to terminate the 
relationship for cause alone. Such evidence may be found in employment manuals, oral agreements, 
and all circumstances of the relationship which demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause or 
to continue employment for a specified period. Although in the past the presumption in favor of at-
will employment has been difficult to overcome, rigid adherence to the at-will rule is no longer 
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Courts are even less likely to find contextual evidence probative in 
overcoming the at-will presumption.  California courts were at the vanguard in 
looking to evidence such as length of service, industry norms, and informal company 
policies in evaluating whether the at-will presumption held in a particular 
employment relationship.32  However, the California Supreme Court has retreated a 
bit from its original stance, emphasizing the importance of written personnel 
documents in evaluating the overall relationship.33  The Court also specified that 
while disclaimers of any additional promises of termination protection are not the 
final word, neither are they meaningless in interpreting the overall employment 
agreement.34  Outside of California, the implied-in-fact exception to the at-will 
presumption remains rare, and as in California, it has lost steam over time.35 
However, some jurisdictions even go beyond the requirement of strong or 
unambiguous evidence to hold that oral evidence itself is insufficient to overcome 
the at-will presumption. This is a fairly remarkable change from the normal rule of 
contract interpretation.  Although the parol evidence rule discharges any agreements 
stemming from oral or written negotiations prior to the execution of a completely 
integrated written agreement,36 most employment agreements are oral themselves, 
and a default “at-will” rule is necessary because the parties have not specified a 
termination rule.37  Nevertheless, certain jurisdictions require that any deviation from 
the at-will rule be in writing.38 In a similar vein, some jurisdictions have applied the 
                                                                                                                                                              
justified or advisable.”).  But cf. Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 345 P.3d 523, 527 (Utah 2014) (requiring 
that “the employer must communicate a manifestation of intent to the employee that is sufficiently 
definite to constitute a contract provision”). 
32  Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387 (Cal. 1988) (“In the employment context, 
factors apart from consideration and express terms may be used to ascertain the existence and content 
of an employment agreement, including the personnel policies or practices of the employer, the 
employee's longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of 
continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged.”(citation 
omitted)). 
33 Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1102 (Cal. 2000). 
34 Id. at 1103-04. 
35 Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 345, 348 (2008) (“Twenty years later, the implied contract doctrine approach to employment 
law has been considerably curtailed.”). 
36 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981) (discharging prior agreements to the 
extent they are “within [the] scope” of the final agreement). 
37 2 CAL. TRANSACTIONS FORMS--BUS. TRANSACTIONS § 12:25 (“Most employees do not work under 
a written employment agreement.”). 
38 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (“The employment relationship is severable at the 
pleasure of either the employee or the employer unless both the employee and the employer have 
signed a written contract to the contrary setting forth that the employment relationship shall remain in 
effect for a specified duration of time or otherwise expressly restricting the right of either party to 
terminate the employment relationship.”); Payne v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 
705, 708 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (“Employers and employees can exempt themselves from the at-will 
presumption by signing a contract with a definite time period of employment.”).   
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Statute of Frauds to “permanent” or indefinite contracts that require something 
more than at-will for termination.  One of the Statute of Frauds’ provisions requires 
that a contract be signed and in writing if it “cannot be fully performed within a year 
from the time the contract is made.”39  Although an employment contract for an 
express term longer than a year would fall within the Statute’s one-year provision, a 
contract of indefinite length would not.  Even if the contract were to last for many 
years, it could be fully performed within a year of its making, as the employee could 
die or leave for another job.  Thus, indefinite term employment agreements do not 
fall within the one-year provisions, and most courts have so held.40  But not all.  In 
Virginia, courts require that contracts that are terminable for cause must be 
construed as setting a definite term for employment, and that term will extend 
beyond one year.41  Thus, for-cause agreements must meet the requirements of the 
Statute of Frauds.  Other courts have held than a contract for lifetime employment 
falls within the one-year provision, despite the fact that it can be performed within 
one year.  Finding the argument that an employee could die within a year to be 
“hollow and unpersuasive, one court stated that a lifetime employment contract was 
“in essence, a permanent employment contract” that “[i]nherently . . . anticipates a 
relationship of long duration—certainly longer than one year.”42 In fact, the court 
argued that “[t]o hold otherwise would eviscerate the policy underlying the statute of 
frauds and would invite confusion, uncertainty and outright fraud.”43 
In addition to clear and, in some cases, written abrogation of the default at-
will rule, some states require additional proof to overcome the presumption.  New 
York requires not only a written statement but also reliance by the employee on the 
termination protection.  As one court has described it: “the plaintiff must rebut the 
presumption of an at will contract by proving the following: 1) there is an express 
written policy (often contained in an employee handbook) that limits the employer's 
right of discharge; 2) the employer made the employee aware of this policy; and 3) 
the employee detrimentally relied on the policy in accepting or continuing 
employment.”44  And in perhaps the strangest and most onerous requirement, 
                                                          
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 130(1) (1981). 
40  See, e.g., Elliot v. Carl H. Winslow, Jr., P.A., 737 So. 2d 609 (Fla. App. 1999); Parker v. Crider 
Poultry Inc., 565 S.E.2d 797 (Ga. 2002); Meng v. Trustees of Boston University, 693 N.E.2d 183 
(Mass. App. 1998); Montgomery County Hospital Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1998); 
French v. Sabey Corp., 931 P.2d 204 (Wash. App. 1997). 
41 See, e.g., Graham v. Cent. Fid. Bank, 428 S.E.2d 916, 917 (Va. 1993) (“However, if an employment 
contract is terminable only for cause, it is one for a fixed period,”); Progress Printing Co. v. Nichols, 
421 S.E.2d 428, 430 (Va. 1992) (“We have held that an employment condition which allows 
termination only for cause sets a definite term for the duration of the employment. However, the 
employment term created by a termination for cause condition, while definite, is not one capable of 
being performed within one year.” (citations omitted)).  
42 McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc.,  680 N.E.2d 1347, 1351-52 (Ill. 1997) 
43 Id. at 1352. 
44 Azzolini v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Waddell v. Boyce 
Thompson Inst. for Plant Research, Inc., 92 A.D.3d 1172, 1173, 940 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (2012) (“This 
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employees in some states must provide additional consideration in exchange for the 
employer’s promise of just cause or “permanent” employment.45  A contract needs 
consideration to be binding, meaning that both parties need to promise to provide a 
benefit or suffer a detriment in the context of a bargained-for exchange.46  But in the 
context of employment contracts, there is no need for separate consideration for 
separate terms; the employee exchanges her labor and additional consideration for 
the employer’s wages and additional consideration.  Nevertheless, some courts have 
created this additional requirement as yet one more hurdle to overcome the 
presumption.47   
Common-law contract doctrine presumes that each contract has an implied 
duty of good faith and fair dealing.48  However, courts have been reluctant to tamper 
with the at-will presumption based on principles of good faith.  Good faith is not 
seen as an appropriate vehicle for diluting the at-will presumption.  As the New York 
Court of Appeals put it:  
 
No obligation can be implied . . . which would be inconsistent with other 
terms of the contractual relationship. Thus, in the case now before us, 
plaintiff's employment was at will, a relationship in which the law accords 
                                                                                                                                                              
[at-will] presumption may be rebutted by proof establishing that the employer made the employee 
aware of its express written policy limiting its right of discharge and that the employee detrimentally 
relied on that policy in accepting the employment.”).  Courts have also interpreted New York law to 
require a reference in the employer’s personnel manual to a policy other than at-will.  See Wanamaker 
v. Columbian Rope Co., 907 F. Supp. 522, 540 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) aff'd, 108 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(finding under New York law “an extremely limited exception to the general rule that no cause of 
action exists for termination of an at-will employee . . . if the employee demonstrates the following: 1) 
the employee was induced to leave his prior employment by the assurance that his employer would 
not discharge him without cause; 2) that assurance was incorporated into the employment application; 
3) the employee rejected other offers of employment in reliance on the assurance; 4) a personnel 
handbook or manual provides that dismissal will be for just cause only.”). 
45 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.03 Reporters’ Notes at 69 (2015) (“Some courts remain 
wary of purported oral agreements promising permanent or lifetime employment, and require ‘special’ 
or ‘additional’ consideration besides the promise to perform service.”); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 
MR1, at 761 (stating that “the doctrine of additional consideration remains relatively intact in cases 
involving oral promises, especially if the promise is for permanent employment”). 
46 Restatement Second of Contracts § 17. 
47 See, e.g., Spacesaver Sys., Inc. v. Adam, 69 A.3d 494, 507-510 (Md. App. 2013) (noting that “an 
employment agreement can be negotiated for the life of the employee,” but only “in very rare 
circumstances” and may “require ‘special’ or ‘additional’ consideration to be valid.”); Wilder v. Cody 
Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 218 (Wyo. 1994) (“[A] claim by an employee that the 
employer promised ‘permanent’ employment does not alter the at will presumption without additional 
consideration supplied by the employee or explicit language in the contract of employment stating 
that termination may only be for cause.”); Murphree v. Alabama Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 449 So. 2d 
1218, 1221 (Ala. 1984) (holding that lifetime-employment contract is enforceable when employee 
provides consideration other than a promise to render services); Henkel v. Educ. Research Council of 
Am., 45 Ohio St. 2d 249, 344 N.E.2d 118 (1976) (same). 
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-304. 
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the employer an unfettered right to terminate the employment at any time. 
In the context of such an employment it would be incongruous to say that 
an inference may be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed to a 
provision which would be destructive of his right of termination. The 
parties may by express agreement limit or restrict the employer's right of 
discharge, but to imply such a limitation from the existence of an 
unrestricted right would be internally inconsistent.49 
 
Although courts have recognized that employees may have claims under the good 
faith covenant, they have been limited to situations in which the employee suffers 
some particularized loss beyond termination of employment, such as the loss of an 
earned bonus.50  In addition, the good faith obligation has been held to forbid the 
firing of an employee for doing what they were hired to do.51 However, good faith 
has not served to alter the basic nature of the at-will rule dramatically, and some 
states do not recognize any duty of good faith in the at-will employment context.52 
 The cumulative effect of these alterations to traditional common-law 
doctrines is to make “at-will” more than just an everyday default rule.  Instead, it is a 
strong or sticky default – a default rule whose presumption is more difficult to 
overcome.53  The doctrinal primacy of the at-will presumption is one of the key 
features of the law of the employment contract that renders it such an anomaly 
within the common law of contracts more generally.54   
                                                          
49 Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 93 (N.Y. 1983); see also RESTATEMENT 
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07 cmt. b (2015) (“Jurisdictions that recognize the implied duty [of good 
faith] in the employment setting therefore also recognize that the duty applies to at-will employment 
in a manner consistent with the essential nature of such an at-will relationship—namely . . . either 
party may terminate the relationship with or without cause.”). 
50 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07(c)(1) (2015) (finding a “duty not to terminate 
or seek to terminate the employment relationship for the purpose of: (1) preventing the vesting or 
accrual of an employee right or benefit”); Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 
1977) (employee was allegedly terminated mere days before he would have earned a substantial bonus 
in order to deprive him of the bonus). 
51 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07(c)(2) (2015) (finding an employer duty not to 
terminate the employee “for the purpose of . . . retaliating against the employee for performing the 
employee’s obligations under the employment contract or law”).  However, New York has rejected 
this approach outside of the context of the attorney rules for professional conduct.  See Murphy, 448 
N.E.2d at 93; Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1987). 
52 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07 Reporters’ Notes to cmt. (a) (2015) (“Some courts do 
not recognize the implied covenant in at-will employment or significantly limit its scope.”); James J. 
Brudney, Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in American Employment Law, 
32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 773, 773-74 (2011) (“The majority of states have declined to apply Good 
Faith at all when reviewing disputes between employers and individual employees.”). 
53 See DeMott, supra note 5, at 498. 
54 See Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1783, 1783-84 (1996) (“As many commentators have noted, there is more than a touch of 
doctrinal peculiarity accompanying decisions purporting to rest on formal contract law but presuming 
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B. The Economic Theory of the At-Will Default 
 
 The employment at-will default rule has been the subject of significant 
debate within the employment law academy as a matter of doctrine.55  There has also 
been a separate debate within the law and economics legal academy on the 
appropriateness of default rules such as the at-will rule.56  And that rule has served as 
a frequent subject of analysis and discussion within the overall debate on default 
rules. 
 The standard law-and-economics theory for setting default rules is that the 
law should endeavor to match what the parties would have selected had they 
explicitly bargained over the term.57  The reason that default rules are necessary in 
the first place, according to the incomplete contracting literature, is that the parties 
face transactions costs in negotiating contractual terms.58  The costs of such 
contracting include information costs—determining what needs to be negotiated 
into the contract, and how—as well as the costs of negotiating with the other party 
on that issue, such as legal fees, conflict creation within the relationship, and delay.59  
The theory provides that parties will negotiate to the most efficient contractual term 
unless transaction costs outweigh the benefits of contracting.60   Therefore, in order 
to reduce the transaction costs of negotiating, as well as to approximate the efficient 
result when transaction costs prevent negotiating, the law should set a default rule 
that best matches what parties would otherwise have agreed to if they bargained 
themselves.61 
                                                                                                                                                              
that all of the elements of a contract exist, or those that find a public policy tort based on highly 
contestable articulations of basic societal values.”). 
55 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption 
from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1113 (2000) (“[T]he employment law academy has long 
debated whether the proper default rule for employment contracts should be that employers may 
dismiss employees ‘at will’ or only for ‘just cause.’”). 
56 See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1; Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of 
Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012); Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note BSP; Eric A. Posner, There 
Are No Penalty Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563 (2006). 
57 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 89 (noting the traditional law and economics answer as to 
the setting of default rules as “one-sentence theories stipulating that default terms should be set at 
what the parties would have wanted”). 
58 For a discussion of the incomplete contracting literature, see Richard Craswell, The "Incomplete 
Contracts" Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151 (2005). 
59 Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 92-93 (“These transaction costs may include legal fees, 
negotiation costs, drafting and printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and probability of a 
contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifying whether a contingency 
occurred.”). 
60 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
61 J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: The Just Cause Debate, 
1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 842 (1995) (“According to majoritarian default theory, the state maximizes the 
joint returns from contracting by providing parties with the term that they would choose for 
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 The employment at-will default has served as an example of such a “would-
have-wanted” default.  In his classic defense of the at-will presumption, Richard 
Epstein argued that the rule best matched with the parties’ interests.62  However, like 
other commentators, Epstein’s analysis assumed the pervasiveness of the rule.63  In 
an empirical study of the hiring practices at private companies, J. Hoult Verkerke 
surveyed employer termination policies to determine whether the at-will rule was the 
choice of the contracting parties.64  His study found that just over half of the 
employment contracts surveyed included an express confirmation of employment at 
will status.65  About one-third of the employers had no specific termination policy, 
while fifteen percent had express just-cause provisions.66  Verkerke interpreted this 
evidence as a strong indication that the parties preferred the at-will doctrine.67  More 
generally, the predominance of the at-will contract—established empirically as well as 
anecdotally—is taken as evidence that the at-will default is doing its job. 
 However, a series of commentators have taken issue with different aspects of 
this traditional theory.  First, Omri Ben-Shahar and John Pottow argued that 
Verkerke’s study contained the seeds of contradiction within its analysis.  Noting that 
states had varying approaches as to the power of the at-will presumption, Verkerke 
predicted that employers in states with more employee-friendly versions of the 
default rule would opt out of that rule less frequently, if that default rule was indeed 
preferable.68  However, he found no difference in opt-outs between employers in 
states with different versions of the rule.69  Verkerke saw this as evidence that a pro-
employer at-will rule was equally preferable, but Ben-Shahar and Pottow saw the 
same evidence as support for the stickiness of the default.70  In their view, a plausible 
hypothesis is simply that the at-will rule has become “highly sticky” and thus is 
adopted simply by default.71  In support of this view, they noted that the Canadian 
province of British Columbia has a default “just cause” rule that can, in fact, be 
                                                                                                                                                              
themselves if there were no transaction costs.”).  For an example in the corporate law context, see 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1444-45 
(1989) (“Corporate law—and in particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courts—fills in the 
blanks and oversights with the terms that people would have bargained for had they anticipated the 
problems and been able to transact costlessly in advance.”).  
62 Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 963 (1984) (discussing 
reasons “why the at-will contract usually works for the benefit of both sides in employment”). 
63 Verkerke, supra note JHV, at 840-41 (discussing the reliance on “theoretical speculation” and 
“secondary and unsystematic” empiricism as to the actual contracting practices in employment). 
64 Id. at 865. 
65 Id. at 867. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 913 (“The revealed preference of market participants resoundingly endorses an at will 
relationship.”). 
68 Id. at 881. 
69 Id. (discussing Virginia & California).   
70 Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note BSP, at 676-77. 
71 Id. at 677. 
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contracted around.72  Relying on anecdotal evidence, they found that most employers 
and employees do not contract around the default just-cause rule to get back to an 
at-will status.73  Although Canadian employers and employee may, in fact, have a 
preference for just cause that their American counterparts do not share, Ben-Shahar 
and Pottow did note that transaction costs—at least in the traditional, narrow 
sense—do not seem to be responsible for the stickiness of just cause.74 
 Default rules may also be sticky for reasons other than transaction costs.  
Numerous commentators have pointed out that adverse inferences or signals that 
may be sent when one party wishes to depart from a default rule.75  Using an 
employment relationship in professional sports as an example, Kathryn Spier argued 
that an athlete might be loath to negotiate on his own behalf for an injury-protection 
clause, for fear that it would signal that he is injury-prone or liable to fake an injury.76  
In the context of at-will, an employee who requests just-cause protection is signaling 
that she is more likely to have the need of such a clause, and thus more likely to 
cause trouble in some fashion.77  In this way, as Walter Kamiat has argued, the 
market for an individual employment agreement is like the market for used cars: 
because of information asymmetries between buyer and seller, a buyer is prone to 
overread signals and suspect the worst when it comes to the quality of the seller’s 
goods or services.78  Ultimately, employees may not request just-cause protection, 
despite their strong desire for it, because they would be punished too severely in the 
market for making such a request.79 
 Other factors may further compound the stickiness of the at-will default.  
One of the cornerstones of research into behavioral heuristics is the endowment 
effect: the notion that individuals value something that they own or possess more 
                                                          
72 Id. at 678-79.  The British Columbian system allows for at-will but provides for mandatory 
termination benefits.  Id. at 678. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 680 (“[I]t cannot simply be a story of transaction costs, because a one-page letter in Canada 
can just as effortlessly become a one-and-a-quarter page letter, with a further sentence setting by 
contract the termination benefits.”). 
75 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59, 70-72 
(1993) (discussing how parties may draw adverse inferences when the other party seeks to depart from 
the default rule); Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432, 433 
(1992) (discussing the signaling effects from a departure from a default rule). 
76 Spier, supra note KES, at 433. 
77 See Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Possible Failures 
of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 1953, 1958 (1996). 
78 See id. at 1957 (discussing George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970)). 
79 Employees can signal as a group that they desire just-cause protection, and they often do so 
through their union representatives.  The fact that unions uniformly request just-cause protections has 
been seen as evidence that all employees actually desire this protection enough to demand it in their 
contract.  However, this argument is less powerful because of the steep decline in private-sector 
unionization. 
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than something that they can acquire.80  Although the original empirical evidence for 
the effect involved mugs,81 scholars have noted the potential for the endowment 
effect to apply to legal entitlements such as default rules.82  The endowment effect 
would make the default rule stickier by making the default more valuable to the 
holder of the default and the alternative rule less valuable to the party that would 
negotiate away from it.  This effect may be at play in the context of the at-will rule, 
as employers may place a higher value on the freedom the at-will rule provides and 
employees might undervalue the protections they would receive from just cause.83  
Employees may even believe that they already have some legal form of just-cause 
protection and therefore not be interested in (redundantly) bargaining for that 
protection.84  Finally, there may also be network effects supporting the at-will rule as 
a default.  The collective advantages from employer use of and comfort with the rule 
may enshrine standardization and render deviance from the rule more costly.85  
 As a result of all of these effects, there may be inefficient “pooling” of 
employees around the at-will default, even when such a rule is inefficient.86  In the 
face of the hardiness of the at-will rule, there are reasons to consider a change to a 
just-cause presumption.  A just-cause rule may foster more efficient bargaining 
between the parties, as employers are more likely to be informed about the law of 
                                                          
80 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Christine Jolls et. al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1998).  But see Gregory Klass, Kathryn Zeiler, Against 
Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2, 5 (2013) (“Although 
endowment theory continues to enjoy considerable influence in the legal literature, recent 
experimental data have cast doubt on the hypothesis that ownership sets the reference point and loss 
aversion generates reluctance to trade.”).  
81 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note KT1. 
82 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 
612 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 109 (2002). 
83 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption 
from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1113 (2000) (“The fact that parties rarely contract 
around the ‘at will’ rule might mean that ‘at will’ employment is efficient for most parties, but it also 
might mean that the status quo bias swamps a preference many parties would otherwise have for a 
‘just cause’ term.”); Sunstein, supra note CS1, at 124 (discussing how both at-will and just-cause 
defaults could remain sticky even if parties could bargain freely around it). 
84 For empirical evidence on employee beliefs as to termination laws, see Kim, supra note PK-Cornell; 
Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 447 (1999).  See also David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract 
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1838-39 (1991) (“Workers, for example, might not realize that 
they should not consent to be fired at will, either because they underestimate the costs that this would 
impose on them or because they misapprehend the importance of the term to employers.”). 
85 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting Increasing Returns, 
Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 354 (1996) (“The relative certainty that 
standard terms offer may lead a lawyer to employ such a term even if the expected value of the term 
to his client is lower than the expected value of a customized term.”. 
86 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 94-95 (discussing pooling and separating equilibria). 
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termination and understand which default is in place.87  They are therefore more 
likely to bargain with employees if they wish to change to an at-will regime.88  This 
argument aligns with the general notion of “penalty defaults” as a way of overcoming 
information asymmetries or strategic bargaining behavior.89  In addition, there are a 
set of arguments for a “just cause” regime as a preferable termination rule.90  These 
arguments generally focus on the power imbalance between employer and employee, 
and the need for some level of protection against termination.91  To the extent that 
any default would be sticky, those who prefer a just-cause rule would prefer that it be 
the default, even if the parties could contract around it. 
 Thus, despite the bedrock doctrinal foundation of employment at-will, there 
is strong support from law-and-economic theory to question its efficiency as a 
default rule.  Its bright glow in the legal firmament may overshadow nuances in the 
preferences of employers and employees that would lead to a rule that is less blunt 
and one-sided.  In other words, there is room for reconsidering the contours of the 
at-will rule given its stickiness as a default.  If a better crafted rule would better serve 
the parties’ interests, it may be unlikely that they would arrive at such a rule through 
their own bargaining. 
 
 
II. PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
 
A. Defining Personal Autonomy in Employment 
 
 Autonomy is the right and ability to control one’s own decisions and actions.  
In the context of political science and international relations, autonomy is used to 
                                                          
87 See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
545, 608 (2014) (discussing the potential for employees to “hold systematically optimistic beliefs about 
the default terms of at-will employment contracts”); Charny, supra note DC1, at 1842 (discussing how 
a just-cause default may be more efficient, even if it is not the majoritarian contracting choice, if 
transaction costs for a just-cause rule are disproportionately high). 
88 Sunstein, supra note CS1, at 119 (“[A] switch of entitlement from employer to employee will 
increase the likelihood that workers will know what the law has and has not given them, and bargain 
accordingly. The optimistic view would be that a switch of that sort might even overcome a market 
failure, in the form of inadequate information on the part of employees.”). 
89 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 98-99 (discussing how default rules can help incentivize the 
sharing of information).  See also Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1592 (1999) (“The effect of a particular default rule on information revelation, 
and thus on efficiency, depends on numerous characteristics of the contracting environment that are 
independent of the ‘hypothetical contracting’ inquiry—that is, merely assessing what the parties would 
have contracted for if there were no private information. Other factors, including the distribution of 
types, the magnitude of transaction costs, and the distribution of bargaining power, will all affect the 
likelihood that a particular penalty default will induce separation and enhance efficiency.”).   
90 See, e.g., Blades, supra note LB1. 
91 See id.  
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describe the governance of a nation as independent from outside control or 
interference.92  This notion of self-government has carried over from nations to 
individuals, as personal autonomy means that the person is in control of her 
destiny.93  An autonomous person is one who is independent from the control of 
others—free to make decisions about her own life and to act on those decisions 
without undue interference from others.94 As Joseph Raz has defined it: 
 
The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should 
make their own lives.  The autonomous person is (part) author of his own 
life.  The idea of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to 
some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions 
throughout their lives.95 
 
 The term “employee autonomy” covers two different aspects of personal 
autonomy: autonomy within the scope of one’s employment, and autonomy outside 
of the workplace.  Employee autonomy at the workplace means the worker’s right of 
control over important aspects of her own working life.  For example, Anne Marie 
Lofaso has described worker autonomy as “answer[ing] the question: what does it 
mean to be part author of one’s working life?”96  Within the context, courts and 
commentators have sharply disagreed over the policy ramifications of protecting that 
autonomy.  The Supreme Court cited to worker autonomy in striking down New 
Deal workplace regulations, arguing in Lochner v. New York97 that prohibiting 
employees from working overtime was akin to treating them as “wards of the 
                                                          
92 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 173(3d ed. 1933) (defining autonomy in 
terms of state political autonomy: “the political independence of a nation; the right (and condition) of 
self-government; the negation of a state of political influence from without or from foreign powers”); 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d College ed. 1982) (defining autonomy as “the condition or 
quality of being self-governing” or “self-government or the right of self-government; self-
determination; independence”). 
93 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 19 
(2004) (“[A]utonomy entails being left alone to satisfy our needs and provide for our own families 
without undue restraint.”); C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 253 
(2011) (“A person's autonomy might reasonably be conceived as her capacity to pursue successfully 
the life she endorses--self-authored at least in the sense that, no matter how her image of a meaningful 
life originates, she now can endorse that life for reasons that she accepts.”). 
94 Complete autonomy is, of course, impossible within a society.  See Baker, supra note CEB, at 253 
(“Surely complete autonomy in this sense is never perfectly realized but will exist only more or less on 
various continuums.”). 
95 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986). 
96 Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 
76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 39 (2007).  She goes on to define worker autonomy as “employees who (1) 
know what issues affect their working lives and know how to resolve those issues according to their 
own interests; (2) have access to information relevant to making informed decisions; and (3) are free 
to effectively decide how to resolve those issues.”  Id. at 41. 
97 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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state.”98  Other commentators argued, however, that the freedom provided under 
laissez-faire capitalism crushes worker autonomy, rather than promoting it.99 
 Worker autonomy within the employment relationship is really about the role 
of the employee within the firm.100  To what extent can employees control their own 
work, control the governance of their firm, or control the culture of the firm itself?  
These concerns are indeed vital to an employee’s sense of autonomy, but they 
involve the relationship between the employee and the firm—namely, the individual 
employee’s relationship with the rest of those who are involved in the ongoing 
business.101 These are a very different set of issues that the relationship between the 
firm and the employee outside of the employment relationship—where, in theory, 
there is no reason for the firm to interfere.  
 Rather than exploring the role of autonomy within the working relationship, 
this article addresses the second meaning of “employee autonomy”: personal 
autonomy outside of the workplace.  In this context, autonomy represents the 
employee’s freedom from employer interference in personal matters.  Within this 
personal sphere, certain types of beliefs, associations, or activities have been more 
closely identified with autonomy.  In the constitutional context, the Supreme Court 
has identified “matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, and child rearing and education” as particularly important to personal 
autonomy.102  Participation in civic life—speaking on matters of public concern, 
voting, joining a political party—has also been accorded particular emphasis.103  
                                                          
98 Id. at 57 (“There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of 
free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker. There is no contention 
that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual 
occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights and care for themselves without the 
protecting arm of the state, interfering with their independence of judgment and of action. They are in 
no sense wards of the state.”). See also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908) (“The right of a 
person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of 
the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the 
person offering to sell it.”). 
99 See Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism, and Autonomy in American Labor Law, 5 EMPLOYEE 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 453, 455 (2001) (“The individualism of freedom of contract in employment, 
however, does not always, in practice, promote personal autonomy for the workers.”); Lofaso, supra 
note AML2007, at 38-48 (arguing that collective rights and actions are necessary to provide workers 
with autonomy within the workplace); Jason Bosch, Note, None of Your Business (Interest): The Argument 
for Protecting All Employee Behavior with No Business Impact, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 639, 658 (2003) (using the 
term “employee autonomy” to refer to off-the-job activities).   
100 See Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell eds., 2012) (discussing the role 
of employees within the corporation). 
101 See Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661, 706 
(2013) (defining employees as those who participate in the ongoing business enterprise of the firm). 
102 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)). 
103 The First Amendment’s protection of speech is often justified on the grounds of personal 
participation in a system of popular government.  See, e.g., Baker, supra note CEB, at 251 (“The 
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Others have singled out recreational activities for their role in personal meaning and 
self-fulfillment.104  These groupings each have their own set of value justifications as 
to why they foster a sense of self and human flourishing related to the concept of 
autonomy.  However, they also each represent a facet of our overall perceptions of 
personal autonomy. 
 This Article defines employee personal autonomy as that zone of activity 
outside of the employment relationship that should be outside the employer’s 
purview.  As one court has framed it: “It may be granted that there are areas of an 
employee’s life in which his employer has no legitimate interest.”105  Personal 
autonomy represents that zone of activity and belief.  And the argument against this 
interference is fairly straightforward: it is wrong for the employer to leverage its 
power over the employment relationship to change employee behavior that is 
unrelated to the relationship.  It is taking power in one realm and using it to distort 
behavior in another.  As Sam Bagenstos has argued, in the context of political 
speech: 
 
[I]n each case, an employer is using its economic power over its employees 
as leverage to obtain greater power in the political sphere. Workers, fearful 
of losing their jobs, will suppress their own political views or express views 
with which they do not agree. The result will be a skewed political 
discourse, in which employers' voices are amplified and workers' are 
squelched.106 
 
At the same time, however, the employer may in fact have significant interests in an 
employee’s beliefs, activities, or memberships that make up her personal 
                                                                                                                                                              
legitimacy of the legal order depends, in part, on it respecting the autonomy that it must attribute to 
the people whom it asks to obey its laws. Despite the plethora of values served by speech, the need 
for this respect, I claim, provides the proper basis for giving free speech constitutional status.”); James 
Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 
(2011) (defending the view that “contemporary American free speech doctrine is best explained as 
assuring the opportunity for individuals to participate in the speech by which we govern ourselves”).  
See also NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY 95 (2015) (discussing intellectual privacy—“a zone 
of protection that guards our ability to make up our minds freely”). 
104 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 250 
(2013) (“The opportunity to choose one's own recreational and avocational activities is a key part of 
what it means to be a full member of our society. Those are often the activities in which individuals 
develop their sense of personal identity and their ties with like-minded people in the community.”). 
105 Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 184 (Pa. 1974).  The court went on to say: “An intrusion 
into one of these areas by virtue of the employer’s power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a 
cause of action, particularly when some recognized facet of public policy is threatened.”  Id.  
106 Bagenstos, supra note SB1, at 256.  See also Bosch, supra note JB1, at 644 (“The market fails here, or 
at least is suspect, because the employer has the ability to use its power over the employee's livelihood 
to gain leverage over other, non-work areas of the employee's life. . . . In essence, strict at-will 
employment allows employers to use economic influence to gain social, moral, and even political 
influence over their employees.”). 
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autonomy.107  Those activities may reflect on the employer’s reputation, may impact 
the employee’s relationships with her coworkers, or may create suspicion about the 
employee’s unobservable job performance.  As a result, the law cannot simply draw a 
bright line between on-duty and off-duty conduct.  To get a better sense of how the 
law has actually managed such conflicts to this point, we now turn to the existing 
legal doctrine. 
   
B. Existing Legal Protections for Employee Personal Autonomy 
 
This Article argues for a default common law presumption that employees 
and employers agree to shield employee personal autonomy from collateral employer 
attack.  Before we build the argument for this presumption, however, it is useful to 
review the various protections provided under current law for concepts included 
within the notion of personal autonomy.  These protections provide evidence that 
employee personal autonomy is deserving of legal protection. 
 
1. Contractual protections.  
Because of the strength of the at-will presumption, the overwhelming 
majority of employees have no contractual protections for their own personal 
autonomy.108  As argued below,109 there is likely an implicit understanding between 
most employees and employers that employees’ private lives are their own business, 
and the employers have little interest in the details of those lives.  But whatever the 
level of these understandings, they are not currently represented within the 
employment contract.  Instead, employers maintain the right to fire employees “for 
any reason, or no reason at all.”110 
At-will is just a presumption, however, and employees are free to negotiate 
for express protections for their autonomy.  The primary way in which employees 
receive such protection is through an umbrella “just cause” provision.  Individual 
employees can negotiate for a “just cause” clause, and there is evidence that a 
significant number of high-level executives, academics, and professionals attain such 
clauses.111  In addition, unions generally negotiate a “just cause” regime with an 
                                                          
107 Bagenstos, supra note SB1, at 258 (noting that “[a]ny protection of private employee speech must 
take account of legitimate employer interests”). 
108 % of employees at-will 
109 See Part III.B infra. 
110 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Iowa 2000).  
111 As to executives, see Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO 
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 246 (2006) 
(finding that “overwhelmingly, the CEO contracts around at-will default in one way or another”); id. 
at 248 (“The overwhelming bulk of CEO contracts . . . are just-cause contracts in the sense that the 
CEO gets greater rights if he or she is dismissed without cause.”).  As to academics, see John M. 
Badagliacca, The Decline of Tenure: The Sixth Circuit's Interpretation of Academic Tenure's Substantive 
Protections, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 905, 905-06 (2014) (“Tenure provides both substantive and 
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attendant grievance-arbitration process.112  Public sector workers, whether unionized 
or not, often are protected by civil service laws that require just cause.113  Employees 
whose contracts are for a definite period of time are presumed to have “just cause” 
provisions in their contracts.114 
In colloquial terms, “just cause” means that the employer must have a good 
reason to terminate the employee.   However, the set of permissible “good reasons” 
expands or contracts in different circumstances.  In the context of definite-term 
employment, just cause is generally limited to an employee’s failure to perform her 
job adequately.115  Executive contracts similarly provide for discharge based on 
failure to perform or willful misconduct.116  “Just cause” clauses in collective-
bargaining agreements generally focus on whether the employee broke a specific 
workplace rule, and if so whether the rule “reasonably related to the orderly, 
efficient, and safe operation of the company’s business and the performance that the 
company might properly expect of the employee.”117  For the most part, one would 
expect that the zone of personal autonomy would lie outside the reasonable or “just” 
concerns of employers for purposes of termination decisions.  However, even just 
cause provisions make allowances for discharge based on “moral turpitude”118 or 
“misconduct.”119  In fact, CEO “just cause” clauses often leave out poor 
performance as a reason for discharge.120  In such circumstances, discharge may be 
limited to the kind of heinous off-duty misconduct that would render the executive 
unfit to continue, such as arrest or conviction for a serious crime.  However, for less 
                                                                                                                                                              
procedural protections to the tenured employee. The substantive protections prevent unlawful 
dismissal—dismissal without adequate cause—while the procedural protections ensure that employers 
follow a certain process during the employment and dismissal of any tenured employees.”). 
112 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.02 cmt. b (2015) (“These collective agreements typically 
provide for an employment relationship other than at-will employment through a ‘just cause’ limit on 
discharge and other disciplinary decisions, and a multi-step grievance procedure culminating in final, 
binding arbitration before a neutral decisionmaker jointly selected by the parties.”). 
113 Pauline T. Kim, Market Norms and Constitutional Values in the Government Workplace, 94 N.C. L. REV. 
601, 615 (2016) (“Civil service provisions often require good cause in order to discharge a public 
employee, and these protections significantly limit public employers' ability to act arbitrarily, including 
in ways that burden their employees' constitutional rights.”). 
114 See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.03(a) (2015) (“An employer must have cause . . . for 
termination of . . . an unexpired agreement for a definite term of employment . . . .”). 
115 Id. § 2.04 cmt. b (“’Cause,’ if not defined in the parties’ agreement, will in these circumstances 
usually refers to misconduct, other malfeasance by the employee, or other material breach of the 
agreement, such as persistent neglect of duties, gross negligence, or failure to perform the duties of 
the position due to a permanent disability.”).   
116 Schwab & Thomas, supra note SSRT2006, at 248. 
117 See Enterprise Wire Co., 46 LA 359, 363-364 (Daugherty, 1966). 
118 Schwab & Thomas, supra note SSRT2006, at 248-49 (finding “moral turpitude” clauses in over 
seventy percent of CEO contracts). 
119 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. b (2015). 
120 Schwab & Thomas, supra note SSRT2006, at 248-49 (“Poor performance on the job does not 
constitute cause in most CEO contracts.”). 
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prominent employees, cause generally focuses on work-related reasons or the 
legitimate business interests of the employer.  The inquiry is broader on the business 
side, as reasons unrelated to the employee herself may come into play, such as a 
business downturn or change in market needs.121  Reasons unrelated to the 
employees’ performance or an employer’s legitimate business needs would almost 
always fail to meet the cause standard.  Arbitrators have followed similar lines in the 
collective bargaining context.122 
Even in otherwise at-will arrangements, an employer may provide protection 
for employees’ private lives by contract.  In certain rare circumstances, courts have 
determined that an employer impliedly agreed to leave an employee’s private life 
alone.  In Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machines Corp.,123  an employee was fired 
for failing to end a romantic relationship with a former employee who had moved to 
a rival company.  Critical to the employee’s case was the “Watson Memo,” a 
memorandum that the then-chairman of the company had provided on the 
separation of work life from personal life.  The memo stated in part: 
 
The line that separates an individual's on-the-job business life from his 
other life as a private citizen is at times well-defined and at other times 
indistinct. But the line does exist, and you and I, as managers in IBM, must 
be able to recognize that line. 
 
I have seen instances where managers took disciplinary measures against 
employees for actions or conduct that are not rightfully the company's 
concern. These managers usually justified their decisions by citing their 
personal code of ethics and morals or by quoting some fragment of 
company policy that seemed to support their position. Both arguments 
                                                          
121 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. c (2015) (finding that the “reasonable 
presumption” about the definition of just cause in indefinite contracts is “that the parties intended not 
only that the employee’s misconduct, malfeasance, inability to perform the work due to permanent 
disability, or other material breach may constitute cause for termination, but also that significant 
changes in the  economic circumstances of the employer can supply such cause”).  Cf. Pugh v. See’s 
Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (1981) (“Care must be taken, however, not to interfere with the 
legitimate exercise of managerial discretion.  ‘Good cause’ in this context is quite different from the 
standard applicable in determining the propriety of an employee’s termination under a contract for a 
specified term.”).   
122 STEVEN L. WILLBORN, STEWART J. SCHWAB, JOHN F. BURTON, JR. & GILLIAN L.L. LESTER, 
EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 265 (5th ed. 2012) (“Arbitrators interpreting union 
contracts with just-cause provisions rarely uphold discharges for off-work conduct unless the 
employer can demonstrate a clear detriment to the workplace.”); Indian Head, Inc., 71 Lab. Arb. 
(BNA) 82, 85 (1978) (“arbitrators have long held that what an employee does on his own time and off 
Company premises is not a proper basis for disciplinary action unless it can be shown that the 
employee’s conduct has an adverse effect on the Company’s business or reputation, the morale and 
well-being of other employees, or the employee’s ability to perform his regular duties.”). 
123 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1st Dist. 1984), overruled on other grounds, Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 
765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). 
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proved unjust on close examination. What we need, in every case, is 
balanced judgment which weighs the needs of the business and the rights of 
the individual. 
 
* * *  
We have concern with an employee's off-the-job behavior only when it 
reduces his ability to perform regular job assignments, interferes with the 
job performance of other employees, or if his outside behavior affects the 
reputation of the company in a major way. When on-the-job performance is 
acceptable, I can think of few situations in which outside activities could 
result in disciplinary action or dismissal.124 
 
The Watson memo was unusual both for the specificity of its concern (as to 
personal autonomy) as well as its focus on company policies relating to discipline and 
discharge.125  Although not framed in terms of an employee’s contract, the memo 
provided strong evidence of a company policy protecting employee personal 
autonomy.  The court held that “this company policy insures to the employee both 
the right of privacy and the right to hold a job even though ‘off-the-job behavior’ 
might not be approved of by the employee’s manager.”126   However, most 
companies have not embraced a version of the Watson memo for their own 
employees, nor have courts hastened to imply contractual protections for employee 
personal autonomy in other cases.  Thus, contract law currently does not provide 
specific protections for employee personal autonomy, and the parties generally do 
not contract for such protections. 
 
2. Privacy protections.   
Theorists and law-makers have long struggled over the definition of 
privacy.127  Famously, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis described privacy 
protection as “the right to be let alone,” which they further elucidated as “the right 
of determining, ordinarily, to what extent [a person’s] thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions shall be communicated to others.”128  Scholars have attempted different 
definitions, but most break down privacy into different sets of privacy interests.129   
                                                          
124 Id. at 530. 
125 Id. (“When such situations do come to your attention, you should seek the advice and counsel of 
the next appropriate level of management and the personnel department in determining what 
action—if any—is called for. Action should be taken only when a legitimate interest of the company 
is injured or jeopardized. Furthermore the damage must be clear beyond reasonable doubt and not 
based on hasty decisions about what one person might think is good for the company.”). 
126 Id. 
127 See ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 3 (2011) (“‘The right to privacy’ frustrates 
theorists who believe the law’s use of the term ‘privacy’ has been especially confusing.”). 
128 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195, 198 (1890). 
129 For example, Daniel Solove has identified four sets of privacy invasions: information collection, 
information processing, information dissemination, and invasions into private affairs.  DANIEL 
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Certain of these privacy interests line up fairly closely with out notions of 
personal autonomy. In its breakdown of privacy interests, the Supreme Court 
described a person’s “interest in independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions” as one kind of privacy interest.130  Similarly, California has interpreted its 
constitutional privacy protections,131 which extend into the private sphere, to include 
the interest in “making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities 
without observation, intrusion, or interference .”132  One example of the so-called 
“autonomy privacy” interest in the context of employment comes from a case in 
which an employer requested private medical information from an employee’s 
doctors and then, based on that information, required the employee to undertake an 
alcohol treatment program or be fired.133  Along with his privacy interest in keeping 
his medical history to himself, the employee also “had an ‘autonomy privacy’ interest 
in making intimate personal decisions about an appropriate course of medical 
treatment for his disabling stress condition, without undue intrusion or interference 
from his employer.”134  The California appeals court analyzed this right under the 
state’s constitutional privacy doctrine, and found that the employee had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy as making his own medical decisions, and that the intrusion 
into the employee’s privacy was a serious one.135  Similarly, courts have at times 
treated employer efforts to influence private employee decisions as invasions of 
privacy.136 
                                                                                                                                                              
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 103-05 (2008).  Anita Allen has identified six types of privacy 
from everyday usage: physical privacy, informational privacy, decisional privacy, proprietary privacy, 
associational privacy, and intellectual privacy.  ALLEN, supra note AA2011, at 4-5. And William 
Prosser identified four types of privacy invasions deserving of protection through tort: intrusion upon 
seclusion, unreasonable publicity to private life, publicity that places another in a false light, and 
appropriation of name or likeness.  William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
130 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).  See also Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone 
Co., 110 F.3d 174,183 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The autonomy branch of the Fourteenth Amendment right to 
privacy is limited to those decisions arising in the personal sphere—matters relating to a marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and the like.”). 
131 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
132 See also Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994) (“Legally 
recognized privacy interests are generally of two classes: (1) interests in precluding the dissemination 
or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’); and (2) interests in 
making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, 
or interference (‘autonomy privacy’).”). 
133 Pettus v. Cole, 49 Cal. App. 4th 402, 457 (Cal. App. 1996). 
134 Id. at 458. 
135 Id. at 458-63. 
136 In Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703 So. 2d 979 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997), a supervisor subjected the plaintiff-
employee to frequent episodes of sexual harassment. When the supervisor learned that plaintiff was 
getting married, he fired her. The court rejected the employee’s wrongful-discharge claim, but it 
denied summary judgment as to her intrusion-upon-seclusion and outrage claims. Id. at 982 (noting 
that marriage and “sexual concerns” are entitled to privacy protections). 
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However, other concepts of privacy also relate to our notions of autonomy, 
albeit more peripherally.  The Supreme Court’s definition of autonomy includes not 
only the interest in independence in making important personal decisions,137 but also 
the interest in “avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”138  This more common 
definition of privacy139 does not directly relate to the employee’s ability to engage in 
off-duty activities outside of the workplace.  However, it can help to facilitate 
personal, non-workplace autonomy by providing a zone of private activity and 
information into which the employer cannot penetrate.  The Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches can protect public employees from having 
to disclose activities or beliefs that occur off-duty.140  The Court has held that 
constitutional reasonableness requirements apply to “searches” of the employee’s 
body, blood, or urine which may reveal personal conduct outside of employment.141  
Similarly, the Supreme Court has assumed the existence of a right to informational 
privacy, which allows employees to keep certain kinds of information private, 
including information about off-duty activities.142  It is important differentiate 
between information privacy interests and autonomy interests, as the right to 
informational privacy only protects the employee from an inquiry or surveillance of 
such activity; it does not protect the employee’s autonomy interests in engaging in 
the activity.  However, these concepts work together.  Privacy protects employees 
against employer efforts to delve into matters of personal autonomy.  Autonomy 
reflects the employee’s ability to engage in autonomous behavior, whether publicly 
or not; privacy allows her to keep this behavior private. 
The Restatement of Employment Law breaks down employee privacy 
interests into three categories: (1) the privacy of places, such as the physical person, 
                                                          
137 Interestingly, this autonomy aspect to the right to privacy within the U.S. Constitution has been 
interpreted in such a way that it is largely irrelevant in the workplace context.   The Court has 
interpreted “interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions” to focus on 
“matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and 
education.”  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1977) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 
(1976)).   
138 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).   
139 In her study of privacy, Christena Nippert-Eng found overwhelming support for the definition of 
privacy as “the ability/power to control access to some thing, place, or piece of information and its 
dissemination.” CHRISTENA NIPPERT-ENG, ISLANDS OF PRIVACY 7 (2010).  Defining privacy as “[t]he 
freedom to do/live/make decisions, without regulation/restriction” received significantly less 
support.  Id. 
140 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. This protection applies to employees when the government acts in its capacity as 
employer. See Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by the Government, even 
when the Government acts as an employer ....”). 
141 See id. (upholding the reasonableness of the search); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 
489 U.S. 602 (1989) (same). 
142 National Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 151-54 (2011) (discussing the 
employer’s inquiry into drug use and wide-ranging opinions of personal references). 
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homes, workplaces, or electronic “locations,” (2) the privacy of personal 
information, and (3) the privacy of preventing disclosure to third parties of private 
employee information disclosed to the employer.143  All three of these privacy 
interests can facilitate an employee’s personal autonomy interests.  Protections 
against invasions into private places can help keep an employee’s personal life free 
from employer observation or influence.  Courts have found that employees have 
privacy interests in their homes,144 hotel rooms,145 lockers,146 bathrooms,147 laptops,148 
and text messages.149 These are all areas where personal autonomy activities may take 
place.  Similarly, privacy protections have applied to personal information—
including information about conduct or beliefs related to autonomy.150  In particular, 
courts have provided privacy protections to information about an employee’s sexual 
practice or history.151  However, almost all courts have held that romantic 
relationships between coworkers—particularly those between supervisors and 
subordinates—are matters of workplace concern and do not constitute private 
                                                          
143 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §7.02 (2015). 
144 Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (finding intrusion (but 
no liability) when investigator took pictures inside employee’s home using a telephoto lens). 
145 Sowards v. Norbar, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 468, 474-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (finding intrusion and 
liability when employer searched employee’s hotel room). 
146 K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 637-38 (Tex. App. 1984). 
147 See, e.g., Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 906-07 (Ga. 1986); Harkey v. Abate, 346 
N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. App. 1983); Kjerstad v. Ravellette Publications, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 419, 422 
(S.D. 1994). 
148 Hilderman v. Enea TekSci Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1204 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (“Whether [former 
employee] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal data saved on the computer 
depends on whether [the employer] still had a policy of allowing employees to purchase their 
laptops.”). 
149 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 766-67 (2010) (assuming that police employees had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in personal text messages, but upholding police department’s search 
as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
150 As one court stated: “highly personal questions or demands by a person . . . may be regarded as an 
intrusion on psychological solitude or integrity and hence an invasion of privacy.” Van Jelgerhuis v. 
Mercury Finance Co., 940 F. Supp. 1344, 1368 (S.D. Ind. 1996).  See also Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 
431 N.E.2d 908, 912 n.9 (Mass. 1982)  (“This opinion simply acknowledges that in the area of private 
employment there may be inquiries of a personal nature that are unreasonably intrusive and no 
business of the employer and that an employee may not be discharged with impunity for failure to 
answer such requests.”). 
151 See Van Jelgerhuis, 940 F. Supp. at 1368 (series of questions and suggestions about employees’ sex 
lives); Aguinaga v. Sanmina Corp., Not Reported in F. Supp., 1998 WL 241260, *1 (N.D. Tex. 1998) 
(supervisor asked employee intrusive and suggestive questions about her sexual activity); Busby v. 
Truswas Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322, 323 (Ala. 1989) (plant supervisor intruding into employees’ sex 
lives); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983) (employer questioning 
of employee about sexual activities with husband); Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703 So. 2d 979 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1997) (improper inquiries into personal sexual proclivities); Guccione v. Paley, 2006 WL 
1828363, *2 (Conn. Super. June 14, 2006) (employer questions about employee’s sexual relation; s 
with her boyfriend); Bonanno v. Dan Perkins Chevrolet, 2000 WL 192933, *1 (Conn. Super. Feb. 4, 
2000) (defendant’s comments regarding plaintiffs’ sex life, appearance, and values). 
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behavior. 152  As to the last category, employers may have information about an 
employee’s off-duty conduct, such as health-related matters or aptitude, that deserves 
protection against further dissemination.153   
 
3. Antidiscrimination protections. 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides employees with protections 
against discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.154  Many 
states and localities also provide protection against similar kinds of status 
discrimination.155  Discrimination against employees with regard to their relatively 
                                                          
152 See, e.g., Rogers v. International Business Machines, 500 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (finding 
that employee’s termination because of a relationship with a subordinate was based on employer’s 
“legitimate interest in preserving harmony among its employees and in preserving its normal 
operational procedures from disruption”); Barbee v. Household Automotive Finance Corp., 6 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 406, 411 (App. 2003) (recognizing employer interests in avoiding conflicts of interest 
between work-related and family-related obligations, reducing favoritism or even the appearance of 
favoritism, and preventing sexual harassment); Crosier v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 
361, 366 (App. 1983) (finding that the employer was “legitimately concerned with appearances of 
favoritism, possible claims of sexual harassment and employee dissension created by romantic 
relationships between management and nonmanagement employees”), disapproved of on other 
grounds by Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 719 
P.2d 854, 857 (Or. 1986) (finding no tortious conduct for termination based on relationship with 
coworker), abrogated on other grounds by McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841 (Or. 1995); 
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 842-43 (Wis. 1983) (same). However, at least one 
court has held open the possibility in dicta that an employer’s actions concerning a consensual 
relationship between employees could be tortious. Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 104 F. Supp. 2d 
1130, 1180 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (stating that “intrusion upon the privacy of an employee’s off-duty, 
consensual relationship with another coworker might be highly offensive in private sector 
employment”).  
As a corollary, off-duty contact between coworkers would falls outside the protections for 
autonomy. See, e.g., Manning v. Department of Employment Sec., 850 N.E.2d 244, 245-46 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1st Dist. 2006) (employee’s conduct in leaving a vulgar message on a coworker’s personal voice 
mail after work was misconduct harmful to the employer). However, note that collective activity 
between employees is protected under the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 
158(a)(1) (2012). 
153 See, e.g., Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. 1990) (holding that employer had a duty 
not to disseminate information about employee’s mastectomy); Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411 
F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that employer had a responsibility as to its handling of the 
personality and aptitude test results); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 
812 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1987) (same). 
154 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
155 Harvey S. Mars, The Conflicting Legal Standards for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Claims: A 
Comparison of the ADEA and Title VII, N.Y. ST. B.J., May 2015, at 34 (“There are a great many federal, 
state, and local laws that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of statutorily protected 
classifications—such as gender, race, color, disability, national origin, religion, and age.”); Chad A. 
Readler, Local Government Anti-Discrimination Laws: Do They Make A Difference?, 31 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 777 (1998) (“Legislation protecting individuals from discrimination in private employment 
has been enacted throughout the United States at the federal, state, and local levels.”). 
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fixed characteristics such as race, color, sex, or national origin does not fall within 
the definition of infringements upon autonomy, as autonomy is based on voluntary 
beliefs and conduct.156  Similarly, federal protections against age discrimination157 and 
disability discrimination158 do not affect employee activities or beliefs, but rather 
aspects of their person. Title VII has been construed to provide protection against 
stereotypical notions about how an employee of a certain sex or race should act.159  
However, this approach has had its limits.160  Employers are still entitled to mold 
employees into a certain image on the job.161  And for our purposes, Title VII’s 
protections against stereotyping are largely related to employee autonomy on the job, 
rather than off.162 
Protections provided by Title VII against sexual harassment can also protect 
employee autonomy.  The Supreme Court has defined sexual harassment as 
“permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.”163  But a 
harasser seeks to invade the employee’s personal zone of privacy and may even seek 
a romantic or sexual relationship with the employee.  It is no surprise than many 
cases of harassment allege not only Title VII violations, but also invasions of 
personal privacy.164 
Personal autonomy considerations become even stronger when the employer 
seeks to discriminate based on religion.  Rather than being a largely immutable 
characteristic, one’s religion is largely a personal decision that can be subject to 
employer pressure.  Religion and religious practice is a zone of activity and belief that 
falls in the heartland of employee personal autonomy.165  Title VII’s protections for 
religion offer important safeguards for this aspect of employee autonomy.  In fact, 
                                                          
156 Cf. Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1483, 1545 (2011) (making the case that if federal antidiscrimination protections are 
based on immutability, they should also extend to “immutable characteristics such as sexual 
orientation, appearance, parental and marital status, and political affiliation”). 
157 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012). 
158 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). 
159 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing sex stereotyping as a method of 
discrimination). 
160 See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Company, Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109-10, 1112 (2006) (holding 
that differential grooming requirements based on sex do not violate Title VII if they do not impose 
unequal burdens and do not impose “impermissible” stereotypes). 
161 For a critique of the branding requirements on employees, see Marion Crain, Managing Identity: 
Buying into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1179 (2010). 
162 See Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the New Face of 
Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 13, 24 n.57 & 31 (2007) (discussing the importance of 
appearance autonomy to workers). 
163 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting in part Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)). 
164 See Part II.B.2 supra. 
165 E. Gregory Wallace, Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 485, 491 
(2009) (discussing religion as a matter of personal autonomy). 
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Title VII extends beyond the personal and into the workplace, as the employer has a 
duty to accommodate the employee’s religion in a reasonable fashion.166  
Sexual orientation is another area of personal autonomy that has received 
antidiscrimination protection.167  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
has recently brought suit alleging that discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
“because of” sex.168  Under current law, many states and localities specifically 
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in employment,169 and a federal law to that 
effect has been proposed and passed the United States Senate.170 
 
4. Tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.   
The wrongful discharge and discipline tort protects employees against 
employer discrimination based on their actions in support of public policy.171  The 
tort is intended to encourage employee behavior in the workplace that benefits third 
parties.  But in a larger sense, the tort calls upon the notion that employees are not 
only participants within their firm, but also citizens within a larger community.172  
Employees are at times expected to heed the call to a higher sense of duty, and it 
makes sense for society to protect them while they engage in that type of activity.  
                                                          
166 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (finding that the employer violates Title VII if it “It is a violation of the statute 
to “fail[s] to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of an employee or prospective employee, 
unless the employer demonstrates that accommodation would result in undue hardship on the 
conduct of its business”). 
167 Cf. Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 110 F.3d 174,183 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The 
autonomy branch of the Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy is limited to those decisions arising 
in the personal sphere—matters relating to a marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child rearing, and the like.”). 
168 See Complaint, EEOC v. Scott Medical Health Center, P.C., (W.D. Pa., No.  2:16-cv-00225-CB, 
filed March 1, 2016) (alleging that employer discriminated against employee on the basis of sex in 
violation of Title VII when it subjected him to harassment because of his sexual orientation and/or 
because he did not conform to the employer's gender-based expectations, preferences, or stereotypes). 
169 SHANNON MINTER, 1 SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 10:9 (March 1, 2016 ed.) (“Twenty-
one states and the District of Columbia prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.”). 
170 Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (as passed by Senate, 
Nov. 7, 2013).  ENDA passed the U.S. Senate in 2013 but was never brought up for a vote in the U.S. 
House of Representatives.  Aglae Eufracio, Venturing into A Minefield: Potential Effects of the Hobby Lobby 
Decision on the LGBT Community, 18 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY'S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 107, 140 (2016).  
President Obama wrote an op-ed article in support of ENDA.  Barack Obama, Congress Needs to Pass 
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, HUFF. POST, Nov. 3, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/barack-obama/enda-congress_b_4209115.html.  
171 For a discussion of the tort, see RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 5.01-5.03 (2015). 
172 See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 388 (Conn. 1980) (“We are . . . 
mindful of the myriad of employees without the bargaining power to command employment 
contracts for a definite term are entitled to a modicum of judicial protection when their conduct as 
good citizens is punished by their employers.”). 
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Courts have thus focused on employer discrimination that “strike[s] at the heart of a 
citizen’s social rights, duties, and responsibilities.”173 
Many of the protected activities under the public policy tort fall within the 
zone of personal autonomy or its penumbra.  One of the earliest and most influential 
of the public policies to be protected under the common law was the duty of jury 
service.174  Courts have also protected employees for engaging in the criminal justice 
process,175 participating in a judicial or regulatory process,176 or abiding by 
professional ethics.177  However, courts have also rejected certain public policy claims 
for being too closely related to personal interests.178  The crux of the tort is the 
protection of socially-advantageous behavior.  As described by one court: “public 
policy must concern behavior that truly impacts the public in order to justify 
interference into an employer's business decisions.”179  As such, autonomy concerns 
are generally secondary to the primary concern: encouragement of actions that 
benefit the public. 
One court endeavored to establish one aspect of personal autonomy—
namely, political beliefs and participation—as a public policy worthy of protection 
under the wrongful discharge and discipline tort.  In Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance 
Co.,180 the Third Circuit read Pennsylvania law as permitting wrongful discharge 
claims where a clear mandate of public policy has been violated.181  According to the 
complaint, John Novosel had worked as a district claims manager at Nationwide 
Insurance until he refused to participate in the employer’s lobbying effort for a 
particular reform to Pennsylvania insurance regulation.   Novosel claimed that his 
refusal to bow to the employer’s political will violated Pennsylvania public policy.  
The Third Circuit agreed.  Citing to a line of political expression protections for 
                                                          
173 Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981). 
174 See, e.g., People v. Vitucci, 199 N.E.2d 78, 79 (Ill. App. 1964) (stating that an employer who 
discharged an employee who was absent because of jury duty was guilty of contempt of court); Nees 
v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975). 
175 Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 879 (employee was fired for participating in “the enforcement of [the] 
State’s criminal code”); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Cal. 1980) (same). 
176 See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978) (employee filed a workers 
compensation claim). 
177 LoPresti v. Rutland Regional Health Services, Inc. 865 A.2d 1102 (Vt. 2004); Rocky Mtn. Hosp. & 
Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1996). See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 
505 (N.J. 1980) (“The sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations, or 
decisions; and judicial decisions.  In certain instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an 
expression of public policy.”). 
178 See, e.g., Scroghan v. Kratco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Ky. App. 1977) (no claim when employee 
terminated after announcing his intentions to attend law school at night).   
179 Rocky Mtn. Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 525 (Colo.1996). 
180 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). 
181 Id. at 898 (citing Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974), and Reuther v. 
Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 120 (Pa. Super. 1978)). 
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public sector employees,182 the Novosel court held that “these cases suggest that an 
important public policy is in fact implicated wherever the power to hire and fire is 
utilized to dictate the terms of employee political activities.”183  The court remanded 
the case for further consideration as to whether Novosel met the specific 
requirements of the tort. 
The Novosel decision has received substantial criticism from courts both 
inside and outside of Pennsylvania.  Nine years after the decision, the Third Circuit 
declined to extend the Novosel approach of relying on a federal constitutional 
provision to provide public policy.184 Citing to a series of lower-court opinions in 
Pennsylvania, the circuit found that “the clear trend of those cases indicates that the 
Pennsylvania courts would be highly unlikely to extend Novosel.”185  Other courts 
have disapproved of Novosel’s notion that the First Amendment’s protections for 
political activity and speech extend to the private sector.186  Rather, they have applied 
the general rule as stated in Truly v. Madison General Hospital,187 that “one does not 
always insure his own retention in employment by wrapping oneself in the first 
                                                          
182 Id. at 899-901 (citing inter alia Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 
(1983)). 
183 Id. at 900. 
184 Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1992). 
185 Id. Interestingly, one judge on the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas went on a jeremiad 
against Novosel, stating that the decision was “[p]erhaps the most glaring example of the federal courts 
pre-disposition toward dictating policy preferences that are contrary to Pennsylvania's.” Shick v. 
Shirley, 1995 WL 864462, at *10 n.7 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1995).   However, that court’s ruling—that the tort 
of public policy did not extend to the filing of a workers’ compensation claim—was later overruled by 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Shick v. Shirley, 716 A.2d 1231, 1238 (Pa. 1998).  And more 
recently, two Pennsylvania opinions have cited Novosel favorably, although as to the general notion of 
public policy.  Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 564 (Pa. 2009); Nazar v. Clark Distribution Systems, 
2000 WL 1616785, *34 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2000).   
186 See, e.g., Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 330 F.3d 250, 262 (4th Cir. 2003) (applying S.C. law) 
(declining to reach “the absurd result of making every private workplace a constitutionally protected 
forum for political discourse”), rev’d on other grounds, 369 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Grinzi 
v. San Diego Hospice Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 900 (Cal. App. 4th 2004) (“We do not find [Novosel] 
persuasive and also decline to adopt it.”); Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 75 P.3d 733, 738-
739 (Idaho 2003) (Novosel policy not “endorsed by any other court”); Shovelin v. Central New Mexico 
Elec. Co-op., Inc., 850 P.2d 996, 1010 (N.M. 1993) (“We did not, however, adopt the approach taken 
by the Third Circuit in Novosel and are not inclined to adopt that approach now.”); Tiernan v. 
Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578, 588-591 (W. Va. 1998) (rejecting the Novosel 
approach in a lengthy discussion); Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (Ill. 1985) 
(constitutional guarantee of free speech provided by Illinois and U.S. Constitutions does not provide 
protection or redress against private individuals or corporations that seek to abridge free expression of 
others); Graebel v. American Dynatec Corp., 604 N.W.2d 35 (Table), 1999 WL 693460 (Wis. App. 
1999) (“Although we recognize a wrongful discharge claim when an employer’s actions violate a 
clearly mandated public policy, the public policy exception may not be used to extend constitutional 
free speech protection to private employment.” (quoting Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 396 N.W.2d 
167, 172 (Wis. 1986))). 
187 673 F.2d 763 (5th Cir.1982). 
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amendment and launching attacks on one's employer from within its folds. At some 
point, while the employer has no right to control the employee's speech, he does 
have the right to conclude that the employee's exercise of his constitutional privileges 
has clearly over-balanced his usefulness and destroyed his value and so to discharge 
him.”188  
 The Novosel court clearly believed that First Amendment protections 
extended into the workplace to protect the employee’s political expression.189  The 
case presents a tough question as to whether the political expression at issue would 
be included in a notion of personal autonomy that existed outside of the workplace.  
On the one hand, the employer wanted the employee to provide support during 
work time, and the political issue directly involved the employer’s business.190  On 
the other hand, the employer may have been looking for the employee’s personal 
endorsement as to the issue, rather than simply his support as an employee.191  It is 
unclear whether employees were simply expected to solicit signatures from others, or 
whether the employees were also expected to personally endorse the bill through 
their own signatures.192  If the employer was looking for the employee to simply 
obtain signatures, it appears that the conduct at issue was wholly within the scope of 
Novosel’s employment.  Along these lines, the cases that have rejected the Novosel 
holding involved employee conduct that was within the employment relationship, 
was potentially unlawful, or infringed upon the employer’s legitimate business 
interests.193  Thus, the many rejections of Novosel are not necessarily rejections of 
legal protections for personal autonomy interests. 
                                                          
188 Id. at 767. 
189 Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983). 
190 Id. at 896. 
191 The opinion states that the employer “solicit[ed] the participation of all employees in an effort to 
lobby the Pennsylvania House of Representatives.  Specifically, employees were instructed to clip, 
copy, and obtain signatures on coupons bearing the insignia of the Pennsylvania Committee for No-
Fault Reform.”  Id.   
192 Samuel Bagenstos has argued that employer efforts to direct employee political activity “threaten 
social equality because they enable the company to transform its economic power over its employees 
into an additional voice in the political realm. And that additional voice enhances the company's 
political power while at the same time squelching the political power of its employees.”  Bagenstos, 
supra note SB2013, at 227. 
193 See Dixon, 330 F.3d at 254-255 (no public-policy protection for Confederate flag on tool box that 
would be visible to coworkers); Grinzi, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 896 (no protection for employee’s 
membership in Women’s Garden Circle, an investment group that the employer believed to be an 
illegal pyramid scheme); Edmondson, 75 P.3d at 736 (no protection for employee’s involvement in 
local- government task force that concerned issues vital to the employer’s interest, particularly when 
employee opposed employer’s interests); Shovelin, 850 P.2d at 1010 (no protection for employee 
serving as local mayor; employer warned employee prior to election that mayoral duties would 
interfere with employee’s ability to perform the job); Tiernan, 506 S.E.2d at 588-591 (no protection for 
employee’s letter, published by newspaper, that was critical of and sarcastic towards the employer); 
Barr, 478 N.E.2d at 1355 (plaintiffs had, prior to said discharge by the defendants, informed fellow 
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5. State off-duty activity statutes.  
Personal autonomy takes the front seat when it comes to state “off-duty” or 
“lawful activity” statutes.  These statutes can be grouped in several categories of 
protections.  At the thinnest level, a set of state statutes protect employees from 
discharge or discipline because of their use of “lawful products,” sometime specified 
as alcoholic beverages and tobacco.194  These protections, passed through the 
influence of purveyors of those products, require that employees use the products 
outside of the employment relationship—off duty, and not on employer premises.195  
Five states offer significantly broader protections for all off-duty conduct, with some 
variations.  Mississippi’s provision protects against interference with employees’ 
“social, civil, or political rights,” but it only provides for civil damages of $500.196  
California, Colorado, and North Dakota provide for protections for all lawful 
activities off the employer’s premises and outside of working hours.197  Finally, New 
York provides protection specifically for “legal recreational activities.”198 
                                                                                                                                                              
employees of layoff procedures being utilized); Graebel, 604 N.W.2d 35, 1999 WL 693460 at *1 
(employee fired because of letter to local newspaper using racially inflammatory expressions). 
194 CONN. GEN. STAT. §31-40s (applying solely to smoking or tobacco products); D.C. CODE ANN. 
§7-1703.03 (smoking or tobacco); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 55/5 (applying to “lawful products”); IND. 
CODE ANN. §22-5-4-1 (tobacco products); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (smoking); LA. REV. 
STATE. ANN. § 23:966 (smoking); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (tobacco products); MINN. STAT. 
§ 181.938 (lawful consumable products); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-7-33 (smoking or tobacco products); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 290.145 (lawful alcohol or tobacco products); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-313 
(lawful products); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.333 (lawful use of a product); N.H. REV. STAT. §275:37-a 
(tobacco products); N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:6B-1 (tobacco products); N.M. STAT. § 50-11-3 (smoking or 
tobacco products); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (lawful products); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 500 (smoking 
or tobacco products); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.315 (tobacco products); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.10-14 
(smoking or tobacco products); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-85 (tobacco products); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 60-4-11 (tobacco products); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (referring to “product” or “agricultural 
product” that is “not regulated by the alcoholic beverage commission”); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1504 
(smoking or tobacco products); W. VA. CODE § 21-3-19 (tobacco products); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
111.321 (lawful products); WYO. STAT. § 27-9-105 (tobacco products). 
195 Matthew W. Finkin, “Lawful Activity” Laws, in WORKPLACE PRIVACY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITY 58TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 409, 412 (2010) (“At the behest of 
commercial interests a large number of states have protected the specific right to consume a lawful 
product—alcohol, tobacco, or both—off the employer’s premises and on the employee’s own time.”). 
196 MISS. CODE § 79-1-9 (providing for a penalty of $250 along with damages to the employee of an 
equal amount). 
197 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (providing a private cause of action for discharges based on Cal. Labor 
Code § 96(k), which protects “lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away from the 
employer's premises”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1) (stating that employers may not 
terminate an employee “due to that employee’s engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the 
employer during nonworking hours unless such a restriction (a) [r]elates to a bona fide occupational 
requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities of 
a particular employee or a particular group of employees . . . or (b) [i]s necessary to avoid a conflict of 
interest with any responsibilities to the employer . . . .”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03, -08 
(outlawing discrimination “because of . . . participation in a lawful activity that is off the employer’s 
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 The intent of these broader statutes is clearly to protect employee personal 
autonomy outside of work.   As one court described the Colorado law: 
 
[T]he law was meant to provide a shield to employees who engage in 
activities that are personally distasteful to their employer, but which 
activities are legal and unrelated to an employee's job duties. In application, 
this statute should protect the job security of homosexuals who would 
otherwise be fired by an employer who discriminates against gay people, 
members of Ross Perot's new political party who are employed by a fervent 
democrat, or even smokers who are employed by an employer with strong 
anti-tobacco feelings. . . . The one common thread that links all of these 
examples is that the statute shields employees who are engaging in private 
off-the-job activity, that is unrelated to the employees[‘] job duties, from 
termination for participation in the non-work related activities.199 
 
However, courts are wary of any activities that actually infringe upon the employer’s 
interests.  A sharp line is meant to be drawn between activities in which the employer 
has a legitimate business interest, and those in which it does not.  For example, in the 
case excerpted above, the Court found that the employee was not protected when he 
wrote a letter to a newspaper critical of the company.200  Even if an activity takes 
place while the employee is not at work, the employer can generally take action 
against the employee if the off-duty conduct harms the employer’s reputation or 
ability to carry on business with the employee. 
 There are also some points of debate about whether certain kinds of 
activities fall within the “lawful activities” definition.   For example, a Colorado 
employee’s use of marijuana off the job for medical reasons was held not to be a 
“lawful” activity since it was illegal under federal law, even though it was legal under 
state law.201  New York has had more ongoing disputes about the content of its 
definition, as courts have taken the “recreational” part of the term as a critical piece.  
Anti-fraternization policies which prohibit employees from engaging in romantic or 
sexual relationships have been upheld under the statute, as dating was held not to 
constitute a recreational activity.  As the court explained in New York v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc.:202  
                                                                                                                                                              
premises and that takes place during nonworking hours” unless the participation is “in direct conflict 
with the essential business interests of the employer” or “contrary to a bona fide occupational 
qualification that reasonably and rationally relates to employment activities”). 
198 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (outlawing discrimination because of “an individual’s legal recreational 
activities outside work hours, off of the employer’s premises and without use of the employer’s 
equipment or other property”). 
199 Marsh v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1462-63 (D. Colo. 1997). 
200 Id. at 1463. 
201 Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849, 853 (Colo. 2015) (“Coats's use of medical marijuana 
was unlawful under federal law and thus not protected by section 24–34–402.5.”). 
202 207 A.D.2d 150 (N.Y. App. 1995). 
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To us, “dating” is entirely distinct from and, in fact, bears little resemblance 
to “recreational activity”. Whether characterized as a relationship or an 
activity, an indispensable element of “dating”, in fact its raison d'etre, is 
romance, either pursued or realized. For that reason, although a dating 
couple may go bowling and under the circumstances call that activity a 
“date”, when two individuals lacking amorous interest in one another go 
bowling or engage in any other kind of “legal recreational activity”, they are 
not “dating”.203 
  
The dissent, however, argued that “[t]he statute, by its terms, appears to encompass 
social activities, whether or not they have a romantic element, for it 
includes any lawful activity pursued for recreational purposes and undertaken during 
leisure time.”204  And while the Second Circuit adopted Wal-Mart’s reading of the 
statute, one judge attacked the interpretation in a concurrence, stating: “It is 
repugnant to our most basic ideals in a free society that an employer can destroy an 
individual’s livelihood on the basis of whom he is courting, without first having to 
establish that the employee’s relationship is adversely affecting the employer’s 
business interests.”205 
 
6. Constitutional and statutory protections for political speech and affiliation.  
In Pickering v. Board of Education,206 the Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment protected public-sector employee speech.  The famous “Pickering 
balancing test”207 has since been modified to require that the speech be on a matter 
of public concern208 and outside of the scope of their employment.209  However, 
government employees do enjoy significant protections to engage in political and 
free speech expression without employer interference.  “The First Amendment limits 
the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict, 
                                                          
203 Id. at 152. 
204 Id. at 153 (Yesawich Jr., J., dissenting). 
205 McCavatt v. Swiss Reinsurance American Corp., 237 F.3d 166, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2001) (McLaughlin, 
C.J. concurring). 
206 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
207 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (“Pickering and the cases decided in its wake 
identify two inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to public 
employee speech. The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter 
of public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based 
on his or her employer's reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then the possibility of a First 
Amendment claim arises. The question becomes whether the relevant government entity had an 
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general 
public.” (citations omitted)). 
208 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
209 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private 
citizens.” 
 These protections are even stronger in the context of political associations.  Public 
employees cannot be fired for belonging to a particular political party unless such an 
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance of the office.210   
Although private-sector employees are not protected by the First 
Amendment, many states prohibit employer adverse actions based on employee 
political activities and expressions.211  Nine states make it a crime to try to prevent, 
restrain, or influence an employee’s political activity by threatening discharge or 
otherwise trying to prevent the conduct.212  A number of other states provide 
protection for political activity, political-party affiliation, campaign contributions, and 
exercising the right to vote.213  Federal law provides for a civil action against a 
conspiracy to “prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully 
entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner” to a federal 
elected official.214  New Mexico makes it a felony to discharge or threaten to 
discharge an employee “because of the employee’s political opinions or belief, or 
because of such employee’s intention to vote or refrain from voting for any 
candidate, party, proposition, question, or constitutional amendment.”215  Two states 
prohibit discrimination against employees on the basis of party membership.216  
Three states protect employees against discrimination based on engagement in 
                                                          
210 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).  Individuals who hold 
policymaking positions where “the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an 
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office,” Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 
are protected against politically-motivated dismissal. See, e.g., Embry v. City of Calumet City, Illinois, 
701 F.3d 231 (7th Cir. 2012). 
For a description of the differences between the First Amendment’s protections for free 
speech and political affiliation, see Craig D. Singer, Comment, Conduct and Belief: Public Employees’ First 
Amendment Right to Free Expression and Political Affiliation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 897 897-98 (1992).  
211 Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer 
Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295, 297 (2012) (“About half of Americans live in jurisdictions that 
protect some private employee speech or political activity from employer retaliation.”). 
212 See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101, 1102; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-108 (misdemeanor); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 23:961, 23:962 (misdemeanor); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.36 (gross misdemeanor); MO. 
ANN. STAT. §§ 115.637(6); 130.028 (misdemeanors); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1537 (class IV 
felony); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.040, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-560; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-11 
(misdemeanor). California, Colorado, and Louisiana have specific provisions for employees to seek 
damages for violations of their provisions. 
213 For a comprehensive discussion of these statutes, see Volokh, supra note EV2012, at 303-34. 
214 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012). 
215 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-20-13, 3-8-78. 
216 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 39A.2(c)(4); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1461.4(A)(1); see also D.C. CODE 
§§ 2-1401.02(25), 2-1402.11(a); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 140 (Puerto Rico); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 
64-1(a) (U.S. Virgin Islands). 
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electoral activities.217  Eight states provide protections for the signing of electoral 
petitions, such as referenda and recall elections.218  Louisiana, Massachusetts, and 
Oregon have specific protections for campaign contributions. 219 
Connecticut has taken the significant step further of applying First 
Amendment protections as a whole to private sector employees through a state 
statute.220  The statute provides that employers, including both private and 
government employers, must not subject employees to discipline or discharge on 
account of their exercise of First Amendment rights “provided such activity does not 
substantially or materially interfere with the employee's bona fide job performance or 
the working relationship between the employee and the employer.”221  Although the 
statute has been interpreted to cover First Amendment activity on the job as well as 
off,222 the Connecticut courts have imported in the “matters of public concern” 
test223 as well as the absence of protection for speech that is part of the employee’s 
job duties, as applied to First Amendment claims.224  Even prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Garcetti, claims under § 31-51q had been subjected to fairly 
stringent “public concern” analysis, which did not include speech that was “directed 
                                                          
217 See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/29-17; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
42.17A.495(2). 
218 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-116, 19-206; GA. CODE ANN. § 21-4-20(b); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
39A.2; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1461.4(A)(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211C.09; MO. ANN. STAT. § 
115.637(6); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 731.40; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.665(1)-(2); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 29A.84.250(4), 29A.94.220(5). 
219 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1461.4(A)(1); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33; OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 260.665(1)-(2). 
220 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q. 
221 Id.  
222 Cotto v. United Techs. Corp., 738 A.2d 623, 632 (Conn. 1999) (finding that § 31-51q “extends 
protection of rights of free speech under the federal and the state constitutions to employees in the 
private workplace”).  Not all Connecticut justices have agreed.  See id. at 634 (Borden, J., concurring 
and dissenting) (concluding that “the statute is intended to reach only speech or conduct of a private 
employee that, based on its location or circumstance, is or would be protected against governmental, 
and not private, action”); Trusz v. UBS Realty Inv'rs, LLC, 123 A.3d 1212, 1235 (2015) (Zarella, J., 
concurring) (“A proper reading of § 31–51q extends protections to private sector employees only 
from discipline or discharge [resulting from] the exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed free 
speech rights outside of the workplace.”). 
223 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
224 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Schumann v. Dianon Sys., Inc., 43 A.3d 111, 128 (Conn. 
2012) (applying the Garcetti threshold test to claims under § 31-51q).  The Court went on to hold that 
the employee speech at question in the case would also not have received protection under the 
traditional Pickering test as well.  Id. at 134-37. The Connecticut Supreme Court recently held that it 
would not apply Garcetti in its interpretation of speech rights under the Connecticut Constitution.  
Trusz v. UBS Realty Inv'rs, LLC, 123 A.3d 1212, 1228 (Conn. 2015) (“Because we find Pickering and 
Connick to be more persuasive than Garcetti, we conclude that the weight of persuasive federal 
precedent favors a broader reading of the free speech provisions of the state constitution than of the 
first amendment.”). 
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‘only’ at issues concerning [the employee’s] employment.”225  The Connecticut 
Supreme Court recently held that “only comment on official dishonesty, deliberately 
unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety can 
weigh out in an employee's favor when an employee is speaking pursuant to official 
job duties.”226  In other words—there must be a public policy component to the 
workplace speech if it is to be protected.  
 
 
III.  PROTECTING EMPLOYEE AUTONOMY THROUGH THE COMMON LAW 
 
 The multitude of protections for employee personal autonomy, appearing in 
various shapes and guises, demonstrate its importance within the employment 
relationship.  But this patchwork of coverages has little doctrinal or logical 
consistency.  Courts and legislatures have selected small pieces of autonomy to 
protect, or have carved out larger chunks for a limited set of employees, such as 
those in the public sector.  Stepping back, as if from a pointillist painting, we can see 
a broader picture of coverage for autonomy interests.  But the collection of 
individual dots lacks the comprehensiveness that the subject deserves. 
 State legislatures, or even Congress, could step in and protect employee 
personal autonomy through off-duty or lawful activity statutes.227  Numerous 
commentators have proposed the widespread adoption of such statutes.228  However, 
this Article specifically looks at the ways in which the common law could approach 
the issue of employee personal autonomy.   
Courts control the basic dynamics of the employment relationship through the 
common law of contract.  Although federal and state statutes provide manifold 
overlays on top of this foundation, the common-law core represents the basis for 
                                                          
225 Daley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 734 A.2d 112, 125 (Conn. 1999).  In Daley, the employee had 
complained about the employer’s failure to abide by its public statements regarding its family-friendly 
workplace.  The jury found that such speech was not on a matter of public concern, and the 
Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed.  Id.    
226 Trusz, 123 A.3d at 1228. 
227 Colorado or North Dakota off-duty activities statutes could serve as models.  COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03, -08. 
228 See, e.g., Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation and American Workers: Employee Blogging and 
Legal Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 326-28 (2007); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do 
When You Are Not at Work?: Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment 
Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 680-83 (2004); Bosch, supra note JB1, at 660 (“[T]he 
legislatures of all fifty states should adopt expanded lifestyle protection legislation that fully protects 
all employee activities that do not have a sufficient impact on the employer's legitimate business 
interests.”); Joseph Lipps, Note, State Lifestyle Statutes and the Blogosphere: Autonomy for Private Employees in 
the Internet Age, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 645, 673-85 (2011) (proposing federal and state legislation).  See also 
Lewis L. Maltby & Bernard J. Dushman, Whose Life Is It Anyway - Employer Control of Off-Duty Behavior, 
13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 645, 658 (1994) (supporting reform to existing state off-duty statutes as 
well as the implementation of such statutes in states without one). 
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any agreement between employer and employee.  As such, courts have a duty to 
manage the law surrounding this relationship. The at-will presumption only increases 
the role of courts, as that presumption dictates the tone for much to follow.  Because 
the at-will rule plays such an important role in shaping the employment relationship, 
courts must attend to the at-will doctrine and make the changes necessary to reflect 
the appropriate balance between parties.  And, on a pragmatic level, courts could 
implement a tort or mandatory contract rule that would work similarly to an off-duty 
or political activity wrongful discharge statute.  Thus, discussion of both would be in 
some senses duplicative. 
 This Part considers two ways in which courts could change the common law 
to protect employee personal autonomy.  First, courts could use the tort of wrongful 
discharge to protect the public policy of employee autonomy.  Second, courts could 
modify the at-will doctrine to include a presumption that the employer will not 
discharge an employee based on activities or beliefs that take place within the zone 
of personal autonomy.  These possible approaches will be taken in turn. 
 
A. Protecting Personal Autonomy through the Tort of Wrongful Discharge 
 
Courts could protect employee personal autonomy through the tort of 
wrongful discharge for violations of public policy.229  The purpose behind the tort is 
to protect broader societal interests within the employment relationship.  The tort 
provides mandatory, nonwaivable protections to employees because the interests at 
stake go beyond the two parties involved.230  The third-party or public interests 
provide the employee with the prerogative to deviate from the dictates of the 
relationship to respond to the higher calling.  In order to encourage and protect 
employees to serve the public, they are given immunity from employer retaliation.231 
Certain aspects of the tort mesh well with the notion of protecting employee 
autonomy.  Courts are responsive to the notion that civic responsibilities need public 
protection.  It was relatively straightforward for courts to provide protections for 
jury service232 and participation in criminal investigations.233  It is a relatively small 
                                                          
229 See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01-5.03 (2015) (describing the wrongful discharge 
tort). 
230 See id. § 5.01 cmt. a (“A principal justification for this public-policy cause of action is that, 
regardless of the terms of the employment, certain discharges that contravene well-established norms 
of public policy harm not only the specific employees but also third parties and society as a whole.”). 
231 A specific example of a public interest is the enforcement of the nation’s laws, which can be found 
in the Supreme Court’s antiretaliation jurisprudence.  See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's 
Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 378 (2010) (describing the Court’s 
“Antiretaliation Principle” as “the notion that protecting employees from retaliation will enhance the 
enforcement of the nation's laws”). 
232 See, e.g., People v. Vitucci, 199 N.E.2d 78, 79 (Ill. App. 1964); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 
1975).  
233 Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981); Tameny v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Cal. 1980). 
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step to include participation in political life, through association or expression, as 
public policy worthy of nurturing.  Expanding the coverage to include religious 
participation stays within the First Amendment, and may seem relatively 
uncontroversial given the protections provided for religion under Title VII.234 
At its core, however, the public policy tort is designed to protect public 
interests.  Protecting jury service and criminal investigations allows the judicial 
system to function.  Protecting reports of wrongdoing to the press or law 
enforcement facilitates the flow of information that may save lives.  There is a strong 
argument that protecting political expression and association inures to the benefit of 
the public, but the rewards are less tangible.  And protecting other recreational or 
off-duty activities does not have the same power of public policy that the traditional 
tort has required.235 
The reaction of many courts to the Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co.236 
demonstrates the perils of protecting autonomy through the wrongful discharge tort.  
Although the response has become more muted, courts were initially quite hostile to 
the Novosel decision, even at a time when courts were more willing to entertain 
challenges to the at-will doctrine.237 Some of this blowback may reflect simply an 
unwillingness to move beyond the at-will rule.  However, other courts argued that 
the extension of public policy to cover First Amendment values had gone too far.  
The First Amendment restricts the government, not private actors, they argued.238  
As such, it was a misconception to bring in public policy concerns to police the 
conduct of purely private actors as to First Amendment expression and conduct. 
Courts have also been concerned about the First Amendment rights of 
employers.  Those rights may be infringed upon if government requires employers to 
continue to associate with employees even when the employer would otherwise 
terminate the relationship based on the employee’s political, religious, or moral 
expressions.239  In Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc.,240 the Washington Supreme 
                                                          
234 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
235 Gely & Bierman, supra note GB1, at 326 (“It is one thing for state courts to say that employees 
cannot be fired for being on jury duty—virtually all do so—and quite another to say that employees 
cannot be fired for anything related to a very broadly construed notion of ‘public concern.’”). 
236 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). 
237 See notes 184-188 supra. 
238 See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1992), as amended (May 29, 
1992) (predicting that “if faced with the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not look to the 
First and Fourth Amendments as sources of public policy when there is no state action”); Bushko v. 
Miller Brewing Co., 396 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Wis. 1986) (“Although we recognize a wrongful discharge 
claim when an employer’s actions violate a clearly mandated public policy, the public policy exception 
may not be used to extend constitutional free speech protection to private employment.”). 
239 See Bagenstos, supra note SB1, at 259 (“There remains the question whether a law prohibiting 
private employers from controlling their workers' political speech—even with the exceptions I have 
suggested—would be consistent with current First Amendment doctrine. After all, an employer's 
interests in this context—in avoiding having others attribute speech with which it disagrees to it, and 
41 
 
Court held that an employee was statutorily protected against termination for 
participating in political rallies while off-duty.241  However, the court then went on to 
find the statute to be an unconstitutional restriction on the company’s First 
Amendment rights to freedom of the press.242  The newspaper’s requirement that its 
reporters not engage in partisan political activity was an editorial decision vital to the 
content of its reporting, found the court.243  These concerns may arguably be limited 
to First Amendment institutions such as media outlets, churches, universities, and 
political parties.244  However, the need to protect the heightened speech, association, 
and free exercise rights of these organizations underlines the more general point that 
all organizations have First Amendment interests.  The Supreme Court highlighted 
these interests in Citizens United v. Federal Communications Commission,245 finding that 
First Amendment protects extend to political speech by a corporation.246  And in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,247 the Court held that corporations can have 
religious identities sufficient to deserve protections for their religious-exercise rights 
as organizations.248  Imposing a tort framework to protect these interests would make 
it more difficult for corporations to balance their own expressive concerns with 
those of their individual employees.  
 Ultimately, tort protection represents a commitment to vindicate public 
values through a cause of action that imposes requirements upon the employment 
relationship.  It is thus more akin to statutory protection for off-duty autonomy 
(whether as a whole or just component pieces such as political participation).  It is a 
societal judgment.  Such judgments generally come from the legislative branch, 
which explains why courts have insisted upon constitutional or legislative 
pronouncements to derive the meaning of public policy.249  Moreover, a tort places 
the ultimate judgment on the interests to be protected in the hands of courts.  Courts 
would define the type of employee conduct that deserves protection and the strength 
                                                                                                                                                              
in engaging in political speech of its own—are interests that the Supreme Court has found to be 
constitutionally based.”). 
240 936 P.2d 1123 (Wash. 1997). 
241 Id. at 1128.  The statute in question—Washington’s Fair Campaign Practices Act—protected 
employees against discrimination based on the employee’s actions “in any way supporting or opposing 
a candidate, ballot proposition, political party, or political committee.”  Rev. Code Wash. § 
42.17.680(2). 
242 Nelson, 936 P.2d at 1129. 
243 Id. at 1131 (“Editorial integrity and credibility are core objectives of editorial control and thus merit 
protection under the free press clauses.”). 
244 See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013) (discussing the role of such 
institutions in First Amendment jurisprudence). 
245 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
246 Id. at 899-900. 
247 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
248 Id. at 2771 (“If for-profit corporations may pursue such worthy [humanitarian and altruistic] 
objectives, there is no apparent reason why they may not further religious objectives as well.”). 
249 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 5.03 (2015) (discussing sources of public policy). 
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of the employer interests required to overcome that protection.250  There are 
advantages to putting the court in the position to judge the balancing of interests, as 
employers are likely to undervalue the employee interests at stake and overvalue 
employer interests.251  However, there are also disadvantages in taking this balancing 
out of the hands of the parties, especially when the balancing can be so context-
dependent on the company’s business, the employee’s role within the company, and 
the employee conduct, membership, or belief at issue. 
Regardless of whether society wishes to impose this new requirement on the 
employment relationship, it makes sense first to explore whether the relationship 
itself already accounts for the concerns.252  An appropriate reading of the at-will rule 
should, in fact, take into account the separation between the employee relationship 
and the employee’s off-duty conduct.  We should to begin with the notion that the 
parties themselves have agreed to protect employee autonomy before we turn to tort. 
 
B. Contractual Protection for Personal Autonomy: Changing the At-Will Default 
 
 As discussed in Part I, the employment at-will default rule is extremely robust 
both in doctrine and practice.  As a matter of doctrine, it is more than just a simple 
gap-filler, as courts have erected procedural and even consideration hurdles for 
parties seeking to overcome the presumption.253  And as a matter of economic 
theory, there is reason to believe that the default rule might remain in place even 
when a change to that rule might result in greater efficiency.254  Rather than a simple 
default rule, it is a sticky default—a default that is hard to shake.255 
 The stickiness of the employment at-will doctrine is particularly problematic, 
because the justifications for the rule do not support its stickiness.  One justification, 
both for at-will and for default rules more generally, is that the default rule makes 
sense because it is the rule that most of the sets of parties would jointly choose for 
                                                          
250 See Bagenstos, supra note SB1, at 258-59 (describing exemptions for a regime of employees political 
speech protections for “cases in which speaking or refusing to speak on a particular topic can be 
regarded as a BFOQ”). 
251 Id. at 259 (arguing that tort-based or statutory protections for employee speech “would eliminate 
some of the employer's traditional prerogative to define employees' jobs” and “resist[] an employer's 
ability to casually and opportunistically leverage its economic power over the speech of employees 
whom the employer can control simply because of the employees' economic dependence on the 
enterprise”); Finkin, supra note MF-2010, at 422 (“If what one does off the job, in one’s private life, 
however lofty or trivial, is an aspect of one’s personality, a component of one’s being human, it 
remains to be seen why the law should presume it to be an element of the wage bargain; why, that is, 
it should be considered a commodity subject to almost no legal restraint on the market.”). 
252 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 88 (“Immutable rules displace freedom of contract. 
Immutability is justified only if unregulated contracting would be socially deleterious because parties 
internal or external to the contract cannot adequately protect themselves.”). 
253 See Part I.A supra. 
254 See Part I.B supra. 
255 See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note BSP, at 677 (calling the at-will rule “highly sticky”). 
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their contract if they were required to bargain over the issue.  Thus, the argument 
goes, the default rule should match what most parties would have chosen in the 
absence of transaction costs.256  However, it makes no sense for such a rule to be 
sticky, because the whole point is to save the parties from needless transaction costs 
while at the same time making it as easy as possible for them to depart from the 
default rule, should they wish.  If the justification for the rule is to save transaction 
costs, it makes no sense to make it more difficult to switch out of the default.  
Instead, the rule should be as unsticky—as greased—as possible to allow the parties 
to switch out to a more efficient solution. 
 There is also little justification for making the at-will rule sticky as a penalty 
or information-forcing default.  First, in order to be a penalty default, the rule would 
have to not be what most parties would choose—that is what makes it a penalty.  So 
a penalty default justification is off the table for those accounts that justify 
employment at-will as a “would have wanted” default.257  But assuming that we take 
that off the table, employment at-will is constructed poorly to force information out 
of the parties.258  The employer is the party with better information about the costs 
of at-will versus just cause, at least on a broader, economic scale.  Employers are also 
less likely to suffer significant reputational consequences from changing the default 
rule: it is more damaging to an individual employee to be seen as a malcontent or 
poor performer, as the individual has much less market power and has few ways in 
which to provide other information to counteract the negative signaling.259   
 Finally, a third justification for the at-will rule is that it is a superior 
termination rule to any alternative.  Were this agreed to be true, then we would want 
the at-will rule to be as sticky as possible to prevent the parties from mistakenly 
choosing a different option.  Richard Epstein, notably, provided a zealous defense of 
at-will making several arguments: because at-will allows the parties to better monitor 
each other’s contract performance; because employers will suffer reputational 
consequences if they abuse their at-will discretion; because at-will allows for risk 
diversification in the midst of imperfect information; and because the administrative 
costs of an at-will regime are less than just cause.260  But these points do not seem 
indisputable enough to justify a sticky default.  As Epstein himself acknowledged, the 
efficiency and equity of the at-will rule have been contested by numerous other 
academics.261  Moreover, Epstein noted that the default nature of at-will is one of its 
                                                          
256 Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 92-93. 
257 Id. (explaining the “would have wanted” term).  Examples of such accounts include Epstein, supra 
note RE1, and Verkerke, supra note RHV1. 
258 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note AG1, at 97 (justifying penalty defaults for “1) giving both 
contracting parties incentives to reveal information to third parties, especially courts, or 2) giving a 
more informed contracting party incentives to reveal information to a less informed party”). 
259 See Kamiat, supra note WK1. 
260 Epstein, supra note RE1, at 962-73. 
261 Id. at 948 (noting that academic commentators “have been almost unanimous in their 
condemnation of the at-will relationship”).  More recent critiques include: Cynthia L. Estlund, 
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beneficial features.262  He argued against a just cause default on the grounds that 
courts might in fact make it too sticky to be shed.263 
 Because defaults are by their nature sticky, to varying degrees, and the at-will 
presumption seems to be particularly sticky, it is important that the rule be tailored to 
match the expectations of the parties to the extent possible.  The at-will rule, in its 
purest form, is an extremely untailored default: it gives unalloyed discretion to the 
employer to terminate the relationship for any reason.  Over time, however, the rule 
has been eaten away at, both through the common law and by statutes.264  The 
wrongful discharge tort prohibits terminations that harm public interests, while a 
panoply of antidiscrimination regimes make it illegal to fire based on race, sex, sexual 
orientation, disability, religion, and age.  These impositions on at-will are mandatory 
rules, not default ones. They indicate the need to manage the stark and unrbridled 
discretion that at-will would otherwise allow. 
 This Article argues that we need further tailoring of the at-will rule, but this 
time as a default.  The law should presume that the parties did not agree that an 
employee could be terminated for conduct that does not occur within the context of 
the employment relationship and has no significant impact upon the employment 
relationship.  This “personal-autonomy presumption” makes sense within the at-will 
doctrine: it assumes that the parties will not base decisions affecting the contractual 
relationship on factors that take place outside of that relationship.265  It assumes that 
the employer will not leverage its employment power to force workers to follow its 
dictates that are unrelated to employment.  It keeps contractual performance within 
the contractual sphere, which is exactly where we would expect the parties to place it.  
Thus, an at-will rule with a personal-autonomy presumption is thus best considered 
as a “tailored default”—an effort to frame the contract as what the parties would 
have agreed to in the absence of transaction costs, reputation costs, behavioral 
heuristics, and other bargaining obstructions.266   
                                                                                                                                                              
Wrongful Discharge Protections in an at-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (1996) (arguing that the at-
will regime imposes underappreciated costs on employee discrimination and retaliation claims); David 
Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment at Will Versus Job Security, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1028-30 (1998) (arguing that the default rule should be changed from at-will 
employment to a “just cause” regime because the just cause regime may better represent an efficient 
outcome between the parties); and Summers, supra note CS-2000. 
262 Epstein, supra note RE1, at 951 (“[T]he parties should be permitted as of right to adopt this form 
of contract if they so desire.”).   
263 Id. at 952 (“By degrees, the original presumption against the contract at will could so gain in 
strength that a requirement that is waivable in theory could easily become conclusive in fact.”). 
264 See Estlund, supra note CE-1996, at 1655 (“The at-will rule now coexists with numerous important 
exceptions—statutory and common law, state and federal—that prohibit the discharge of employees 
for particular bad reasons.”). 
265 Cf. Fineman, supra note JF-2008, at 356 (“Employers should not be able to foster employee 
expectations about job security, and then act in contravention of those expectations after reaping 
increased employee productivity and loyalty.”). 
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 The personal-autonomy presumption also provides another layer of 
protection for off-duty employee conduct, activities, and beliefs.  The plethora of 
statutory and common-law provisions described in Part II.B offer variegated 
protections for different aspects of employee autonomy.  These protections provide 
indirect evidence that the parties expect some level of personal autonomy as a matter 
of contracting.  But they also show that society as a whole values personal autonomy 
and has put in place different legal regimes to shield it from employer attack.  Given 
the many mandatory rules in place regarding aspects of personal autonomy, it makes 
sense to switch the default rule to a setting that also protects personal autonomy.  
For these reasons, the personal-autonomy presumption makes sense even as a 
penalty default.  Assuming that employers would strongly prefer to contract back to 
an at-will rule without the personal-autonomy presumption, changing the default 
would penalize employers who are not clear about their expectations as to important 
personal conduct outside of the workplace. By forcing employers to address the 
issue, the autonomy default would promote clearer interactions between employers 
and employees as to the boundaries of the employment relationship.267  For these 
reasons, a default rule that requires “clear” or “unambiguous” intent to circumvent it 
may do a better job of forcing information out of the employer.  For example, a 
personal-autonomy presumption could require employers to specifically explain 
under what circumstances they will consider off-duty conduct to be relevant to the 
workplace.  Such a “stickier” default could force the employer to be clearer to the 
employee about the employer’s expectations for personal behavior and the behavior 
or conduct when not at work.  There is no doubt that off-duty employees can 
behave in ways that embarrass their employers or damage their employer’s 
reputations.268  Setting expectations early on in the relationship can help both 
employers and employees get more out of the relationship for the long term. 
 How would a personal-autonomy default work?  The Restatement of 
Employment Law sets forth one possible avenue.  Section 7.08 of the Restatement 
states that “[u]nless the employer and employee agree otherwise, an employer is 
subject to liability for intruding upon an employee’s personal autonomy interests if 
the employer discharges the employee because the employee exercises a personal 
autonomy interest.”269  Personal autonomy interests are defined as beliefs, conduct, 
or activities that take place outside of the employment relationship, including lawful 
conduct, political or religious beliefs, and participation in lawful associations.270  The 
employer does not face liability if the employee’s autonomy interests interfered with 
the employer’s legitimate business interests, including its “orderly operations and 
                                                          
267 See id. at 97 (discussing the information-forcing properties of the penalty default). 
268 See Matthew Bodie, The Internet Wants You to Lose Your Job, QUARTZ.COM, Feb. 3, 2016, 
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reputation in the marketplace.”271  This approach to the personal-autonomy default 
tailors the rule to provide an explicit exception to the exception.  This tailoring is 
likely what most employment relationships would settle on, as no employer wants to 
suffer serious reputational consequences from having an employee with off-duty 
misconduct.272 
The need to provide for employer protection is thus best accomplished 
through a modification to the at-will default rule.  Some employers may have 
reputations or businesses that are more sensitive to harm from employee off-duty 
conduct, or may care more about such conduct.  The Republican Party may care if 
one of its employees is a Bernie Sander supporter; a religious university may care if 
one of its employees no longer shares its religious faith; an anti-alcohol educational 
group may care if its employee is captured on video while intoxicated.273  It makes 
sense to, at the very least, begin with the personal-autonomy presumption and see 
how employers adapt to the new default before moving to a mandatory and 
comprehensive approach. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This Article advocates for a change to the employment at-will default to 
make clear that the employer will not terminate employees for exercising their 
personal autonomy, as long as that exercise does not interfere with the employer’s 
business or reputation.  But is the very notion of employee personal autonomy a 
doomed project—an ever-shrinking zone of personal space?  The threats are 
manifold.  Employees are conducting more and more of their personal life while at 
work and on employer-provided equipment, and more and more of their 
employment duties at home.274  The field of people analytics, which applies big data 
to human resources and personnel matters, looks to capture insights about 
employees from a dizzying array of data sources—the more unconventional, the 
better.275  As the reach of the analytics technology expands, employers may look to 
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what the employee had for breakfast, what she reads in her spare time, how much 
sleep she gets, and how much caffeine she drinks in calculating and managing the 
sources of employee productivity.  Employees’ personal reputations are now more 
easily connected to their employers, such that a drunken Friday night tirade or an 
offensive tweet can bring down the weight of thousands or even millions of social 
media participants onto the person and their employer.276  And in the platform 
economy, the employee/independent service-provider is a locus of reputation to an 
even greater extent.277  All of these are sources of pressure on the divide between our 
employment relationship and our personal lives. 
 It may be that the separation of “work” and “home” was only a temporary 
and perhaps illusory manifestation of historical patterns in business and culture.  And 
if employees do become more of their own individual “brand,” they may not mind 
the diminishment of autonomy if they have more power and control over their work 
lives.  But the opposite is also possible: employees may be drawn ever further into 
the employer, such that they have to conform even their personal lives and identities 
to the employer’s brand.278  Their entire existence could be oriented around 
maximizing their performance for their employer.279 
 The ferment around employee personal autonomy is demonstrated by the 
many legal doctrines which deal with the subject.280  Changing the at-will default to 
accommodate personal autonomy is a small step, but an important one.  The 
personal-autonomy presumption recognizes the common law’s role in managing the 
employment relationship and in tailoring the at-will default to recognize the parties’ 
reasonable expectations.  And it promotes the exchange of information over the 
employer’s approach to off-duty conduct, associations, and beliefs.  Although the 
future of employee autonomy is uncertain, the law needs to change so that the at-will 
rule does not hasten autonomy’s demise—unnecessarily and inappropriately. 
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